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“SWEET CHILDISH DAYS”: USING 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH IN 
EVALUATING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OUT-OF-
COURT STATEMENTS BY YOUNG CHILDREN  
Lynn McLain* 
We’ll talk of sunshine and song, 
And summer days, when we were young; 
Sweet childish days, that were as long 
As twenty days are now.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For too many children, what should be “sweet childish days”2 of innocence 
and safety are terrorized by adults’ physical, mental, or sexual abuse,3 with the 
physical abuse of young children often so extreme as to cause their deaths.4  
Despite some sensational cases, such as the McMartin Preschool case where reports 
of sexual abuse were unfounded,5 commentators observe that false reports 
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 1. William Wordsworth, To a Butterfly, in 4 THE HOME BOOK OF VERSE, AMERICAN AND 
ENGLISH 1471, 1471 (Burton Egbert Stevenson ed., 1915), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=ZxxKAAAAMAAJ. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 455 n.2 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (recounting 
statistics, including that “[i]n 1995, local child protection services agencies identified 126,000 children 
who were victims of either substantiated or indicated sexual abuse. Nearly 30% of those child victims 
were between the ages of four and seven”); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES. CHILD MALTREATMENT ix (2009), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf (“Victims [of child abuse and neglect] in the 
age group of birth to 1 year had the highest rate of victimization at 20.6 per 1,000 children of the same 
age group in the national population.  Victimization was split between the sexes with boys accounting 
for 48.2 percent and girls accounting for 51.1 percent.  Less than 1 percent of victims had an unknown 
sex.  Eighty-seven percent of victims were comprised of three races or ethnicities—African-American 
(22.3%), Hispanic (20.75), and White (44.0%).”  Of those children who were abused:  “[m]ore than 75 
percent (78.3%) suffered neglect; [m]ore than 15 percent (17.8%) suffered physical abuse; [l]ess than 10 
percent (9.5%) suffered sexual abuse; and [l]ess than 10 percent (7.6%) suffered from psychological 
maltreatment.”); Myrna Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes 
Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 241 nn.15-19 (2010) 
(pointing out that many cases of abuse are not reported to child protection services).  See infra note 13. 
 4. In the United States, “[m]ore than five children die every day as a result of child abuse. . . . 
approximately 80% of children that die from abuse are under the age of 4.”  National Child Abuse 
Statistics, CHILDHELP, http://www.childhelp.org/pages/statistics (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 5. Raeder, supra note 3, at 242 nn.20-24. 
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comprise a small minority.6 
The negative ramifications of child abuse are far-reaching.7  Abused children 
are more likely to abuse alcohol, become addicted to drugs, become pregnant as 
teens, commit violent crime, and be arrested than are children who have not been 
abused.8  Most tragically, evidence of the defendant’s having been abused as a 
child is often offered as mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings, after 
the defendant has been convicted of a heinous crime.9 
When an abused child is young and is the only witness to the abuse, proving 
the misconduct becomes extremely problematic if the child either cannot testify at 
trial or cannot testify effectively.10  The burden of proof as to physical abuse will 
be difficult to meet when a child’s injuries, such as broken bones, could also have 
been caused by an accidental fall.  Sexual abuse that leaves no physical evidence11 
will be that much more difficult to prove.  Even if there is compelling physical 
evidence that sexual abuse has occurred—such as when a toddler has gonorrhea or 
another sexually transmitted disease12—the child victim is usually the only one 
who has first-hand knowledge of the identity of the abuser, so that the case will 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See JULES EPSTEIN, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 31:04, at 6, 8 n.1 (4th 
ed. 2008) (“most reports [of child abuse] are true”); James M. Wood et al., Child Sexual Abuse 
Investigations: Lessons Learned from the McMartin and Other Daycare Cases, in CHILDREN AS 
VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND DEFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW 82 (Bette L. 
Bottoms et al. eds., Guilford Press 2009) [hereinafter Bottoms] (“[T]he large majority of sexual abuse 
allegations made by children to police and [child protective services] today are probably true and 
reliable.”). 
 7. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 468-69 (Alito, J., dissenting) (recounting serious, lasting, disturbing 
effects on child rape victims, as well as adverse ramifications to society, including victim’s greater 
likelihood of committing sex crimes and prostitution). 
 8. See BARBARA TATEM KELLEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IN THE WAKE OF CHILDHOOD 
MALTREATMENTS 1 (Aug. 1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/165257.pdf (The long 
term effects on maltreated children include “delinquency, pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse, school 
failure, and emotional and mental health problems.”),  
 9. See, e.g., Glenn Small, Thanos: Violent, Venomous – and ‘Damaged’ ‘Sick’ Convicted Killer is 
Product of Abuse, Lawyer Says, BALT. SUN, (Oct. 31, 1993), available at 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-10-31/news/1993304035_1_thanos-baltimore-county-sick 
(relating father’s severe physical and emotional abuse of convicted murderer).  
 10. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“Child abuse is one of 
the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses 
except the victim.”); Charles W. Ehrhardt & Ryon M. Mccabe, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: 
Admitting Out-of-Court Statements of Child Victims and Witnesses in Louisiana, 23 S.U. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1995) (referring to the lack of other witnesses and the difficulty in obtaining corroborating evidence in 
“child abuse cases”). 
 11. Not all sexual abuse will result in physical evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Bahe, 40 F. 
Supp. 2d 1302, 1303 (D.N.M. 1998) (physician testified that digital penetration would “not necessarily 
leave any physical traces”); State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566, 571 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (“[I]n most cases of 
child sexual abuse, there is no physical evidence or eyewitness.”). 
 12. See, e.g., State v. Maldonado, 536 A.2d 600, 601 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (three-and-one-half 
year old girl had gonorrhea); R.S. v. Knighton, 592 A.2d 1157, 1158 (N.J. 1991) (one of five boys who 
were alleged sexual abuse victims of day care center operator had venereal warts); In re Interest of L.S., 
748 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App. 1988) (eighteen-month-old girl had vaginal discharge and gonorrhea; 
there was also other medical evidence that she and her three half-sisters had been sexually abused).  See 
also infra note 109. 
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necessarily fail unless the child’s testimony or out-of-court statement is admitted.13 
Young children are frequently precluded from testifying at trial on the grounds 
of incompetency because they cannot answer questions about abstract concepts 
regarding “truth” and “lies.”14  In this situation, should the child’s earlier, out-of-
court statements disclosing the abuse and identifying the abuser also be 
inadmissible?  The intuitive answer may be “yes, of course!”  The lawyerly answer, 
however, should be, “it depends.” 
The stakes are huge.  If young children cannot testify, and their out-of-court 
statements are precluded, they simply become safe prey, unprotected by the judicial 
system.15  The pivotal question becomes, are there procedures that can ensure 
fairness both to children and to their alleged abusers?16 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The number of children 
sexually abused each year in the United States has been estimated at between 60,000 and 100,000, and 
even these disturbing statistics are under-inclusive because many cases go unreported.  Detecting sexual 
abuse, and convicting its perpetrators, is problematic because of the lack of witnesses, the difficulty of 
obtaining corroborative physical evidence, and the typical reluctance or inability of the victim to testify 
against the defendant.  In light of these circumstances, the out-of-court statements of the child victim 
take on exceptional significance; a youngster’s hearsay statements in sex abuse cases often constitute the 
only proof that a crime has occurred.”) (citations and footnotes omitted);  Livia L. Gilstrap et al., Child 
Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 59, 62 (2005) (discussing why most cases where children are essential witnesses are sexual abuse 
cases). 
 14. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 15. Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 
1020 (2000) (“As a general rule, if the child witness cannot qualify [to testify], the prosecutor cannot 
prove up her case.”).  See also id. at 1025 & n.31 (pointing out that prosecutors very often decline to 
prosecute when the child victim is unlikely to be found competent to testify); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 
F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Often, the child is the only witness.  Yet age may make the child 
incompetent to testify in court. . . .  ‘[W]hen the choice is between evidence which is less than best and 
no evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.’”) 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, advisory committee’s note).  For additional information, see sources 
cited supra note 13 and infra note 109.  As to the shameful inadequacy of our judicial system’s 
protection of children, see Child Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 
109-11 (1990) (statement of Dr. Muriel Sugarman, child psychiatrist) [hereinafter Sugarman] (“In 73.7 
percent of the [divorce] cases [in which child sexual abuse was alleged], the divorce court system did 
not believe the allegations.  The conclusions of evaluators without proper qualifications who found no 
evidence of sexual abuse were accepted over those of qualified evaluators.  About 58 percent of the 
children were inadequately protected from further sexual abuse, from intimidation and harassment by 
the perpetrator, and from fear of retaliation.”); Karla-Dee Clark, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: 
Childrens’ Rights to Be Free From Child Sexual Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 214 (1990); 
Rebecca K. Connally, “Out of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children Even Bear Testimony?, 
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2008, at 1.  See generally BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON 
TRIAL: AMERICA’S COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (2d ed. 1991). 
 16. See People v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1085, n.1 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (“Two alternative 
hazards are confronted.  On the one hand, in accepting the testimony of a child there is the danger that 
she may not be telling the truth, in which event an innocent man may be convicted of crime and suffer 
the consequences thereof.  On the other [hand], if the child’s testimony is not accepted, a man guilty of 
crime, and possibly with the potential for more . . . will go free.  In this connection, it must be borne in 
mind that when such an offense [assaulting and taking indecent liberties upon a child] is committed, it is 
done with the greatest possible stealth and secrecy, so that most often the testimony of the victim, 
coupled with the type of corroboration we have here, is the only evidence available upon which to 
determine guilt or innocence.  The fact that there are difficulties involved should not prevent the 
processes of justice from functioning.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445, 
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The parameters of the criminal justice system were re-set in 2004 by Crawford 
v. Washington.17  Under Crawford and its progeny the confrontation clause18 will 
generally exclude the child’s out-of-court statement from admission at trial, if the 
statement is found to be “testimonial” and is offered against a criminal accused but 
the child does not testify at trial.19  The confrontation clause will not bar the 
evidence, however, if the child’s statement is nontestimonial20 or if the defendant 
has forfeited her confrontation right.21  The confrontation clause is also 
inapplicable to many proceedings where child abuse is at issue, such as divorce, 
child custody, or other family court22 or juvenile23 proceedings regarding alleged 
abuse or neglect of a child. 
When the confrontation clause is inapplicable, the due process clauses of the 
                                                                                                                 
447 (Utah 1965)).  Cf. State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255, 262-263 (Fla. 2006) (finding that protected 
persons’ and tender years statutes protect interests both of defendants and of mentally disabled or child 
victims). 
 17. 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witness against him. . . .”).  This right is applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965). 
 19. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.  Under Crawford and its progeny, the confrontation clause applies 
only to “testimonial” statements, those as to which the declarant is considered a “witness against” the 
accused, within the meaning of those words in the Sixth Amendment.  E.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 821-22 (2006) (holding that the confrontation clause applies to hearsay only when it is 
“testimonial.”  Statements made in response to police interrogation to establish “past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution” are testimonial, whereas statements made “to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency” are nontestimonial).  Regarding the determination of which 
statements are testimonial and which are not, see, for example, Connally, supra note 15, at 21 (arguing 
that the inquiry must be made from the perspective of “a reasonable child in the declarant’s position”); 
Christopher Cannon Funk, The Reasonable Child Declarant After Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. 
Rev. 923 (2009); Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to 
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007).  See also infra notes 113, 
115.  Prof. Friedman has argued that extremely young children ought not be considered “witnesses” 
within the confrontation clause; if a child is too young to be expected to testify, “we should admit their 
statements for what they are worth, without pretending that the children have the capacity to act like 
adults.”  Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 251-52 & n.34 (2002). 
 20. See generally Davis, 547 U.S. 813.  Additionally, see infra note 115. 
 21. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367-68 (2008).  See also Clifford S. Fishman, The Child 
Declarant, the Confrontation Clause, and the Forfeiture Doctrine, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 279 (2010).  
 22. E.g., State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Frank G., 108 P.3d 543 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2004), aff’d sub nom. State v. Pamela R.D.G. (In re Pamela A.G.) 134 P.3d 746 (N.M. 2006) (petition 
against parents for child abuse and neglect). See Jules Epstein, Foreword: Why “The Child Witness” 
Now?, 10 WIDENER L. REV. i, vii n.32 (2010) (“[I]t has been estimated that ‘[i]n the United States alone, 
hundreds of thousands of children are deposed, interviewed and examined each year as part of civil and 
family court proceedings, abuse/neglect investigations, and other types of criminal investigations.’”) 
(citation omitted); William Wesley Patton, Viewing Child Witnesses Through a Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatric Lens: How Attorneys’ Ethical Duties Exacerbate Children’s Psychopathology, 16 WIDENER 
L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2010) (“Most law review articles and psychological studies have focused on child 
witnesses in adult criminal cases. . . .  However, in reality, the number of child victim witnesses who 
testify in adult criminal courts pales in comparison to the number of child abuse victim witnesses who 
testify in civil child dependency hearings.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 23. E.g., State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (juvenile delinquency). 
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment gain new importance.24  By virtue of the due 
process clauses, neither a civil nor a criminal judgment may be based on unreliable 
hearsay.25  On the other hand, due process will not have been violated if the 
judgment is based on reliable hearsay, even though the out-of-court declarant does 
not testify at trial.26  Opposing counsel can be expected to argue that any statement 
by a child who is found to be incompetent to testify is inherently unreliable.  Yet 
both case law and research in developmental psychology refute that “black and 
white” position. 
This article argues that a child’s testimonial incapacity at trial ought not 
automatically bar the admission of those nontestimonial statements that fall within 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Admissibility should turn on whether, in light of 
principles of developmental psychology as applied to the particular child, at the 
time the child made the statement he was capable of making an accurate statement 
of that type: if so, the evidence ought not be excluded on the ground of 
incompetency to testify. Attacks on the child’s credibility should go to the weight 
of this evidence, not its admissibility. 
It may be helpful, in understanding the counterintuitive proposition that a 
person who is incompetent to testify at trial nonetheless may have earlier made a 
reliable statement, to consider similarly situated adult witnesses.  It is easy to 
recognize that an adult who cannot testify because she has developed dementia or 
Alzheimer’s disease at the time of trial may have years earlier made a reliable 
statement that falls within a hearsay exception.27  To exclude it because of the 
person’s present incompetence would be to deprive the judge or jury of valuable, 
irreplaceable evidence. 
That premise also holds true for a young child who spoke of recent, concrete 
facts when she had first-hand knowledge and a clear memory of them but—due to 
age-appropriate, physiologically based developmental psychology—cannot 
demonstrate the ability of long-term recall or an understanding of the abstract 
concepts of truth and falsity required for being a witness at a trial long after the 
event in question.  This article argues that, in these situations, the trial court should 
evaluate the qualities and circumstances of each proffered hearsay statement; if it 
concludes that both the statement is reliable and that it qualifies under a hearsay 
exception, the statement may be constitutionally admitted unless barred by 
Crawford.  Thus, such statements ought to be admitted (1) in any non-criminal 
proceeding; or (2) in a criminal trial if either (a) the statement is offered by the 
accused or (b) the statement is “nontestimonial” and is offered by the prosecution.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Lynn McLain, “I’m Going to Dinner with Frank”: Admissibility of Nontestimonial 
Statements of Intent to Prove the Actions of Someone Other Than the Speaker—and the Role of the Due 
Process Clause, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 377, 416-30 (2010) (making this argument). 
 25. Id. at 425 & n.284.  See also infra note 117. 
 26. E.g., State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 286, 292-93 (Neb. 2004) (ruling there was no 
confrontation clause violation in admission of examining physician’s testimony to nontestifying child’s 
statement that “her Uncle DJ put his finger in her pee-pee,” and even if the requirement of reliability of 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), still applies to nontestimonial statements, no error occurred); 
Frank G., 108 P.3d at 543 (holding no due process violation in child abuse and neglect adjudication). 
 27. See generally Johnson v. State, 492 A.2d 1343 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (finding trial court’s 
admission of 89-year-old’s excited utterance at time of event was proper, despite fact that declarant was 
in a nursing home and incompetent at time of trial). 
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Admissibility is consonant with the general trend toward permitting the fact-finder 
to properly gauge credibility by admitting impeachable evidence, rather than 
excluding it.28  As in all other situations, if the evidence is admitted, appellate 
review will be available as to whether the trial court erred in finding the hearsay to 
be reliable and, if error occurred, whether the verdict was based on the unreliable 
hearsay.29 
Part II of this article will discuss the difficulty in proving cases where children 
are key witnesses.  Young children are often ruled incompetent to testify at trial.  
Even if they are found competent to testify, they often make ineffective witnesses.  
For both of these reasons, if the children’s out-of-court statements are reliable they 
will have significant probative value that cannot be replaced by the declarants’ in-
court testimony.30 
Part III will address the constitutional parameters and will review judicial 
decisions that have recognized that a determination of reliability of the out-of-court 
statement requires a separate and different analysis from the question of the 
defendant’s competency to testify at trial.  It will also critique cases that appear to 
stand for the opposite proposition, as either having themselves been misinterpreted 
or having misread the authority they relied on. 
Part IV will posit that the courts’ evaluation of the reliability of a young 
child’s statement should take into account not only the circumstances under which 
the statement was made, as some have done in the past, but also established 
principles of developmental psychology: what aptitudes of perception, memory, 
and accurate recall can a child of a certain age be expected to have?  The author 
will argue that, if at the time the statement was uttered, the child was capable of 
making an accurate statement of the type offered, then the testimonial 
incompetency ruling should not exclude it.  As long as the statement complies with 
the other rules of evidence it should be admitted.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
(“Rule”) 806 and its many state corollaries,31 the out-of-court child declarant’s 
credibility will be subject to impeachment just as if the child had testified.32  The 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See, e.g., Lawson v. State, 865 A.2d 617, 631 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (holding that trial court 
properly admitted child’s out-of-court statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony and left 
the “question of credibility to be resolved by the jury”), rev’d on other grounds, 886 A.2d 876 (Md. 
2005); see also infra notes 61-66, 83, and accompanying text; see generally 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 13.2 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
 29. E.g., Nunley v. State, 916 N.E.2d 712, 722-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
 30. See infra note 38. 
 31. See 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL xvii n.2 (2d ed. 2001) 
(citing 38 states, in addition to Maryland, as having adopted evidence codes modeled on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence). 
 32. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides in pertinent part: 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) has 
been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if 
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those 
purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.  Evidence of a statement or conduct 
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement, is not 
subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to 
deny or explain. 
FED. R. EVID. 806.  As restyled effective December 1, 2011, Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides: 
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author will also argue that, in order to promote an accurate evaluation of a child 
witness’s credibility if the child testifies, courts should use Rule 611(a) to preclude 
questioning of children by developmentally inappropriate, confusing questions. 
II.  THE OFTEN IRREPLACEABLE PROBATIVE VALUE OF CHILDREN’S OUT-OF-COURT 
STATEMENTS  
Children may be key eyewitnesses in many types of proceedings, both civil33 
and criminal.  The inherent drama when this is the case has inspired Hollywood in 
making such films as “The Sixth Sense.”  In the real world, children may have been 
the victims of alleged abuse or neglect34 or may have witnessed crimes to others, 
such as the murder of their parent35 or the sexual abuse of their sibling.36 
Thus, both prosecutors and civil litigants may find themselves dealt a hand 
where their key witness is a young child, making it difficult to prove their case.  
Very young children are often found incompetent to testify at trial.37  Even when a 
child witness is permitted to testify, he or she is likely inherently to be a far less 
effective witness than most similarly situated adults.   
                                                                                                                 
When a hearsay statement – or a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) – 
has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then 
supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant 
had testified as a witness.  The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s inconsistent 
statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had an 
opportunity to explain or deny it.  If the party against whom the statement was admitted 
calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as 
if on cross-examination. 
FED. R. EVID. 806 (Proposed Official Draft 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 33. E.g., Rosche v. McCoy, 156 A.2d. 307 (Pa. 1959) (finding reversible error to permit minor 
personal injury plaintiff’s playmate to testify, when she was seven years old, to event she witnessed 
when she was four). 
 34. E.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. 77 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 35. See Perry v. State, 848 A.2d 631 (Md. 2004); Nick Madigan, Perry Again Found Guilty of 
Killing 2 Women in ‘98, BALT. SUN (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-
02-08/news/bs-md-ci-perry-retrial-verdict-20110208_1_killings-guilty-verdict-janice-bledsoe (daughter 
of one of the murder victims testified as “key witness” at both trials; she was four years old at the time 
of the killings; at the first trial she was seven years old, and at the retrial she was seventeen). 
 36. E.g., United States v. Hollis, 54 M.J. 809, 811, 814-16 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (ruling four-
year-old sister of six-year-old victim made admissible statements to pediatrician, describing sexual 
abuse four-year-old had witnessed). 
 37. E.g., Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1993) (Minnesota state court finding child 
incompetent); People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (reversing sexual abuse 
conviction on ground that there was inadequate “corroborative evidence” of truth of victim’s out-of-
court statements to meet requirement of tender years statute; the victim, defendant’s daughter, who was 
three years old at the time of the alleged abuse, and four-and-one-half years old at the time of trial, had 
been found incompetent to testify at trial); People v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1085 n.1 (Colo. 1989) 
(en banc); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (parties stipulated that child was 
incompetent to testify); Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 279 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969); State v. Lanam, 
459 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Minn. 1990); State v. Massengill, 62 P.3d 354, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); State 
v. Waddell, 527 S.E.2d 644, 647-50 (N.C. 2000); State v. Rogers, 428 S.E.2d 220, 222 (N.C. App. 
1993); State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 467 (Ohio 1988); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2005).  
2011] “SWEET CHILDISH DAYS” 85 
In either event—that children cannot testify or cannot testify effectively—their 
out-of-court statements, if reliable, will possess irreplaceable probative value.38  
Recognition of the added probative value of out-of-court statements is what has 
led, in general, to the recognition under the rules of evidence to exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.  Thus admissibility of such children’s reliable statements is consonant 
with the goals of the rules of evidence. 
A.  Irreplaceable Probative Value Is a Familiar Concept Underlying the Hearsay 
Exceptions Recognized in the Rules of Evidence 
The rationale for most, if not all, of the myriad exceptions to the hearsay rule 
(the general rule against admissibility of an out-of-court statement when offered to 
prove the truth of some fact that was being asserted by the out-of-court declarant 
when making the statement)39 is that qualifying pretrial statements will possess 
probative value that cannot be recaptured at trial.  Those codified under Rule 804 
admit the hearsay only if the out-of-court declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, 
so that the irreplaceable nature of the evidence is obvious.40 
But the numerous hearsay exceptions codified under Rule 803 are also based 
on the theory that the hearsay has probative value beyond that which the 
declarant’s live testimony could provide.41  For that reason, the hearsay falling 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992) (finding child’s excited utterances or 
statements made when seeking medical treatment had probative value); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 
1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979) (three-year-old child sexual assault victim’s “declaration to his mother at the 
time of the event was more, rather than less probative than testimony that he might have been able to 
give months after the event even if the district court would have found him competent.”); State v. Hosty, 
944 So. 2d 255, 262 (Fla. 2006) (“Like children’s hearsay statements, mentally disabled adults’ hearsay 
statements shortly after the alleged criminal incident would likely be more reliable than their in-court 
testimony many months or years later, due to both their diminished cognitive abilities and their highly 
fragile emotional states.”); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 209 n.5 (Fla. 1998)) (“The child’s first 
accounts of an incident of sexual abuse are sometimes more reliable than later testimony given in the 
often intimidating courtroom setting. . . .  [B]oth the Arizona and Florida supreme courts have held that 
the child’s earlier testimony is the kind of irreplaceable substantive evidence that might be more 
probative than in-court testimony, thus excusing unavailability.”); Rocha, 547 N.E.2d at 1343 (citing 
State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 814 (Ariz. 1987); Lawson v. State, 865 A.2d 617, 631 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2005) (“Indeed, it has been observed that a child’s out-of-court statements may ‘be more reliable 
than the child’s testimony at trial, which may suffer distortion by the trauma of the courtroom setting or 
become contaminated by contacts and influences prior to trial.’ . . .  That is why, we hold, that any 
conflicts between Nigha’s out-of-court statements and her in-court testimony do not render her out-of-
court statements inadmissible, but rather present a question of credibility to be resolved by the jury.”) 
(citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 886 A.2d 876 (Md. 2005); State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 
429 (Utah 1987) (stating that out-of-court statements by child victims of sexual abuse provide more 
accurate accounts than their testimony at trial because they are “made nearer to the time of the incident 
and removed from the pressure of a courtroom situation”). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c), 802. 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 41. See White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 (“[T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony 
regarding spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care is that 
such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their 
trustworthiness.  But those same factors that contribute to the statements’ reliability cannot be 
recaptured even by later in-court testimony.”). 
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under Rule 803 is admissible even if the declarant testifies at trial.42 
The “nonhearsay” categories of Rule 801(d)(2), regarding statements of a party 
opponent, are also recognized in light of the fact that the party would be unlikely to 
reiterate those statements at trial.43  The out-of-court statements are irreplaceable.  
Similarly, when the out-of-court declarant testifies at trial, Rule 801(d)(1) 
recognizes other categories of out-of-court statements that will be admissible as 
substantive evidence44 because of the probative value they are perceived to add.  
Finally, the addition of essential probative value is an explicit prerequisite for 
admissibility under the “catch-all” or residual hearsay exception codified in Rule 
807.45 
Child witnesses, like adults, may be unavailable to testify at trial for any 
reason recognized under Rule 804(a),46 but young children are much more likely 
than adults to be unavailable as a result of having been found to be incompetent to 
testify.47  This remains true despite efforts in numerous jurisdictions to make it 
easier for children to be found qualified to testify.48  When child witnesses are 
unable to testify at trial, their out-of-court statements will not be excluded by the 
hearsay rule if they fall within any exception recognized by Rules 803, 804 or 807. 
B.  Competency to Testify 
Traditionally, courts have been hesitant to allow young children to testify 
without having first established their competence.  There have been several 
concerns: (1) that young children may not have the ability to understand the 
relevant facts or to distinguish fact from fantasy;49 (2) that they may not have a 
sufficient command of the language to explain their observations without being 
                                                                                                                 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).  See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (Co-conspirator 
statements admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) “provide evidence of the 
conspiracy’s context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in 
court.”). 
 44. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).  Some jurisdictions also recognize hearsay exceptions for prompt 
complaints of rape, but generally only where the declarant testifies at trial.  E.g., MD. RULE 5-802.1(d); 
Coleman v. Higgins, 351 P. 2d 901, 903 (Mont. 1960). See generally J.T.W., Annotation, Admissibility 
of Evidence of Complaint or Details of Complaint by Alleged Victim of Rape or Other Similar Offense 
as Affected by Fact that She Is Not a Witness or Is Incompetent to Testify Because of Age or Other 
Reason, 157 A.L.R. 1359 (1945). 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 46. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(a); MD. RULE 5-804(a); State v. Silverman, 906 N.E.2d 427, 430 
(Ohio 2009) (child victim had been killed in a fire set by his mother, before his father was tried for 
sexual abuse). 
 47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Lyon, supra note 15, at n.135 (collecting California, Colorado, and Michigan statutes and 
Massachusetts and Tennessee cases). 
 49. See generally George B. Collins & E. Clifton Bond, Jr., Youth as a Bar to Testimonial 
Competence, 8 ARK. L. REV. 100, 105 (1953) (“Often the child intermingles imagination with memory, 
with resulting damage to the opposing party.”); John H. Flavell, Cognitive Development: Children’s 
Knowledge About the Mind, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 21 (1999). 
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misleading; or (3) that they will not appreciate sufficiently the seriousness of the 
proceeding to feel the duty to tell the truth.50 
Historically, at common law, a child under the age of ten years was presumed 
to be incompetent to testify and was permitted to testify only if the trial judge 
examined the child and found the child to have sufficient capacity both (1) to 
remember and (2) to relate facts at the time of trial, as well as (3) to understand and 
be bound by the oath.51  Although the per se age bar has been abandoned,52 many 
United States jurisdictions continue to mandate a positive showing of the latter 
three requirements.53  The inquiry is as to the particular child’s testimonial 
capacity. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 509 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979) 
(arguing, however, that the child simply should be allowed to testify, for what his or her story may seem 
to be worth).  See also id. § 1751 (cited in State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 473 n.11 (Ohio 1988)). 
 51. Collins & Bond, supra note 49, at 100-01; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 508.  See also State v. 
Poole, 859 P.2d 944, 946 (Idaho 1993) (“Although the common law at one time automatically 
disqualified children as competent witnesses, the trend of the law favors general competency.”). 
 52. E.g., Perry v. State, 848 A.2d 631, 640 n.7 (Md. 2004) (“[T]here is no evidence or proffer that 
[the seven-year-old witness] Jewel suffered from learning disabilities, some kind of communication 
problem, a mental disability or disorder, or poor academic performance.  There is also no evidence in 
the record that the defense was denied an opportunity to question Jewel, before the trial, to determine if 
there was any evidence of an inability to understand the difference between lying and telling the truth.  
It appears quite clear that defense counsel’s concern about Jewel’s ability to understand the difference 
between truth and fiction was based solely on a false assumption that a child’s young age automatically 
calls into question her ability to understand the difference between truth and lies.  That kind of 
assumption in no way presents a ‘substantial question’ regarding one’s competency as a witness.”) 
(citing Evans v. State, 499 A.2d 1261, 1271-72 (Md. 1985)) (emphasis in original); Brandau v. Webster, 
382 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (finding error for chancellor to refuse to conduct voir 
dire examination of five-and-one-half-year-old child, either in court or in chambers, but to rule that as a 
matter of law she was too young to testify). 
A 1985 Maryland statute provides that, specifically in a child abuse case, the alleged child victim 
may not be precluded from testifying because of “age.”  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103 
(West 2006).  Under the approach apparently contemplated by the bill’s sponsors in the Maryland 
General Assembly, an approach long ago advocated by Wigmore, see supra note 50, the court would 
have to let the child testify and leave it to the fact finder to give no more credit to the child’s testimony 
than it is worth.  See Sia, Child Abuse Bills Supported, Faulted, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27, 1985, at 3F, col. 4.  
See generally Jonathan Spodnick, Competency of the Child Witness in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining 
the Constitutionality of Connecticut General Statute § 54-86h, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 135 (1989). 
 53. E.g., State v. Maldonado, 536 A.2d 600, 604 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (trial court properly 
determined that six-year-old victim was competent to testify; “The trial court’s unusually thorough 
inquiry was more than adequate for its evaluation of the child’s maturity and its effect on his ability to 
receive accurate sensory impressions, to recall and narrate events and the subject matter of his 
testimony, and to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth.”); State v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 
1965) (“The testimony of a six-year-old child is not rendered completely incompetent nor entirely 
discredited solely because of her age.  As we have previously observed, no particular age nor any 
specific standard of mental ability can be set as the qualification for giving testimony, but it is an 
important factor to be considered, along with others, in determining whether she should be allowed to 
testify.  What is essential is that it appear that the child has sufficient intelligence and maturity that she 
is able to understand the questions put to her; that she has some knowledge of the subject under inquiry 
and the facts involved therein; that she is able to remember what happened; and that she has a sense of 
moral duty to tell the truth.  Whether she meets these tests and is therefore a competent witness is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine.  His ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a 
clear showing of abuse.  We find no such indication here.  After the trial court is satisfied with the 
competency of the witness, the final judgment as to the credibility and weight to be given her testimony 
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Most cases in which children are key witnesses—child custody, termination of 
parental rights, criminal prosecutions for child abuse, and juvenile delinquency—
are within the jurisdiction of state courts.  State evidence law applies to these cases.  
Under the Assimilative Crimes Statute,54 the federal courts hold trials for child 
abuse and similar matters occurring on military bases and other federal lands, 
including Indian reservations.55  The Federal Rules of Evidence apply only to these 
latter trials.56  Both state and federal trials are subject to the restraints imposed by 
the United States Constitution.57 
1.  Federal Courts 
Federal Rule of Evidence 601, which became effective in 1975,58 provides that 
“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these 
rules.”59  This rule adopted the model that generally all persons are competent to 
testify, and weaknesses in a person’s testimony should be brought out by 
impeachment.60  The witness’s foibles—such as difficulties in perception,61 
                                                                                                                 
is for the jury.”) (footnotes omitted); State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765, 770 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (“A young 
child is competent to testify as a witness at trial if that child has (1) an understanding of the obligation to 
speak the truth on the witness stand, (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence to receive an 
accurate impression of the matter about which the witness is to testify, (3) a memory sufficient to retain 
an independent recollection of the occurrence, (4) the capacity to express in words the witness’ memory 
of the occurrence, and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it.  The determination of 
competency rests primarily with the trial judge who sees the witness, notices his or her manner and 
demeanor, and considers his or her capacity and intelligence.”) (internal citations omitted). See Lyon, 
supra note 15, at 1023 & nn.16-21 (explaining that even those states that technically have removed the 
oath requirement still, de facto, require oath-worthiness). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
 55. E.g., United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2000) (juvenile delinquency); United 
States v. Beaulieu, 194 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 56. In civil matters, however, “with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State 
law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with 
State law.”  FED. R. EVID. 601  As restyled and slated to be effective December 1, 2011, Rule 601 reads: 
“Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise. But in civil case, state 
law governs the witness’s competency regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule 
of decision.” FED. R. EVID. 601 (Proposed Official Draft 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 57. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 58. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1926, 1934 (1975) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. app. at 341 (2006)) 
 59. FED. R. EVID. 601. 
 60. See infra text accompanying note 68. 
 61. See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 2001) (no error in admitting testimony 
of an involuntarily committed schizophrenic eyewitness); United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027, 1028 
(4th Cir. 1982) (trial court’s disqualification of defense witness who suffered from hallucinations, was 
criminally insane, and incompetent to stand trial was reversible error, when his treating physician 
indicated that witness “had a sufficient memory, that he understood the oath, and that he could 
communicate what he saw”). 
Even under the law before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an insane person could 
testify if he or she had a “sufficient understanding of the nature of an oath and [was] capable of giving a 
correct account of what he [had] seen and heard.”  Lockard v. Parker, 164 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir. 1947); 
6 MCLAIN, supra note 31, §§ 607:3, :8. 
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imprecision in speech,62 lapses in memory,63 bias or prejudice,64 or poor character 
as to veracity65—go to the weight the fact-finder will decide to give her 
testimony.66 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 464 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (deaf-mute victim who 
communicated by unique system of noises and gestures was not incompetent to testify; trial court did 
not err in permitting him to testify, even though he did not know a standardized system of sign 
language); United States v. Villalta, 662 F.2d 1205, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (witness’s lack 
of fluency in translating Spanish to English goes to weight of testimony, not competency, when 
recounting transaction conducted in Spanish; holding that he was incompetent was reversible error); 6 
MCLAIN,  supra note 31, §§ 607:3, :8. 
 63. See United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discretion to 
allow government witness, who admitted she “had ‘some very substantial memory problems’ and was 
‘emotionally unbalanced,’” to testify); 6 MCLAIN, supra note 31, §§ 607:3, :8.  As to impeachment of a 
witness by her prior inconsistent statements, see FED. R. EVID. 613; 6 MCLAIN, supra note 31, §§ 613:1, 
:3. 
 64. 6 MCLAIN, supra note 31, §§ 607:2, :7. 
 65. Id. §§ 608:1-:2, :4-:5, 609:1-:10. 
 66. See United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1999) ( “As long as a witness has the 
capacity to testify truthfully, it is best left to the fact-finder to determine whether he in fact did so.”); 
Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1175-1176 (9th Cir. 1997) (no violation of either due process or 
confrontation right in Montana state trial court’s admission of young child’s testimony, when child may 
not have understood the oath and her “testimony was riddled with inconsistencies,” but defense had had 
opportunity to develop these flaws on cross examination); Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (no error in admitting defendant’s deposition; argument that he was incapable of telling truth 
because of medication goes to weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility), rev’d on other 
grounds, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 110, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Most 
writers are of the opinion that ‘[t]he trial court’s responsibility under Rule 104(a) to determine 
preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of witnesses is largely vitiated by Rule 601 which 
makes all witnesses competent except where state law applied [sic] the rule of decision and declares a 
witness incompetent . . . .’ Rule 601 . . . represents . . . ‘the culmination of the modern trend which has 
converted questions of competency into questions of credibility while “steadily moving towards a 
realization that judicial determination of the question of whether a witness should be heard at all should 
be abrogated in favor of hearing the testimony for what it is worth.’”  Weinstein suggests that it is 
‘probably more accurate to say that [in determining questions under Rule 601], the Court will decide not 
competency but minimum credibility.’  Under this rule every witness is presumed to be competent.  
Neither feeble-mindedness [nor] insanity renders a witness incompetent or disqualified. . . .  The only 
grounds for disqualifying a witness under Rule 601 . . . are that the witness ‘does not have knowledge of 
the matters about which he is to testify, that he does not have the capacity to recall, or that he does not 
understand the duty to testify truthfully. . . . ‘ Whether the witness has such competency is a matter for 
determination by the trial judge after such examination as he deems appropriate and his exercise of 
discretion in this regard is to be reversed only for clear error.”) (citations omitted); United States v. 
County of Arlington, Va., 702 F.2d 485, 489-490 (4th Cir. 1983) (letter from German ambassador 
admitted, in absence of any evidence that he was not competent to testify); United States v. Jackson, 576 
F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The fact that a witness is a narcotics user goes not to his competency, but 
to his credibility.”); United States v. Van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1976) (addict competent 
despite fact he took opium while on the witness stand; question of credibility properly left to jury); 
United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1975) (“Competency of a witness to testify, as 
distinguished from the issue of credibility, is a limited threshold decision by the trial judge as to whether 
a proffered witness is capable of testifying in any meaningful fashion whatsoever.”); United States v. 
Jones, 482 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[I]t has become the modern trend to limit even the trial 
court’s power to exclude testimony because of incompetency and to make the pivotal question one of 
credibility. . . .”) (dictum); United States ex rel. Lemon v. Pate, 427 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(“[T]he fact that [a prosecution witness] was an addict was a matter to be considered in connection with 
his credibility and the weight which should be given his testimony but not his competency.”); United 
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Under Rule 601, youth alone is insufficient to preclude a child from 
testifying.67  As the Advisory Committee’s note explains: 
No mental or moral qualifications for testifying as a witness are specified.  
Standards of mental capacity have proved elusive in actual application.  A leading 
commentator observes that few witnesses are disqualified on that ground.  
Discretion is regularly exercised in favor of allowing the testimony.  A witness 
wholly without capacity is difficult to imagine.  The question is one particularly 
suited to the jury as one of weight and credibility, subject to judicial authority to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence.68 
Rule 601 is complemented by the first-hand knowledge requirement of Rule 602,69 
as well as by the oath or affirmation requirement of Rule 603. 
Rule 603 provides: “Before testifying, every witness shall be required to 
declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered 
in a form calculated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ 
mind with the duty to do so.”70  This rule has been applied to prevent young 
children from testifying when the child has not demonstrated, to the trial judge’s 
satisfaction under Rule 104(a),71 the ability to distinguish “truth” from a “lie.”72  
                                                                                                                 
States v. Hicks, 389 F.2d 49, 50 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (no error to refuse to strike testimony 
against defendant of a witness who admitted on cross-examination that, inter alia, she used narcotics, 
heard voices telling her that “they” would take her to Hell, and was scheduled for a mental examination 
in a state hospital); Fowel v. Cont’l Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 205, 207-08 (D.C. 1947) (fact that witness 
had been drinking heavily on day he testified would affect his credibility not his competency).  See 
generally 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 61-62 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“Even if the 
trier of fact lacks legal training, it is still better on balance to let the evidence come in for what it is 
worth with cautionary instructions.”); 3 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 6:1-05 (3d ed. 1997); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 501, Michael Graham, Evidence and 
Trial Advocacy Workshop: Competency of Lay Witnesses, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 141 (1984); Lawrence E. 
Nill, Witnesses Under Article VI of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1236 
(1969); Lester B. Orfield, Competency of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 324 
(1962). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1989) (no 
error in permitting children to take witness stand before court found them to be competent), vacated, 
497 U.S. 1021 (1990). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note (citations omitted). 
 69. FED. R. EVID. 602.  As restyled and slated to be effective December 1, 2011, Rule 602 reads: “A 
witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter.  Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of 
the witness’s own testimony.  This rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.”  
FED. R. EVID. 602 (Proposed Official Draft 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 603.  As restyled and slated to be effective December 1, 2011, Rule 603 reads: 
“Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully.  It must be in a form 
designed to impress that duty in the witness’s conscience.”  FED. R. EVID. 603 (Proposed Official Draft 
2011). 
 71. The trial court determines competency.  E.g., United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777, 784 (8th Cir. 1977).  See also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) 
(“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness . . . shall be determined 
by the court. . . .  In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with 
respect to privileges.”).  Note that Rule 104(a), as restyled and slated to be effective December 1, 2011 
provides: “The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a 
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Several commentators have criticized the manner of questioning of children as to 
these matters as developmentally inappropriate.  They have characterized the 
typical types of questions posed by judges as more appropriate to adults’ ways of 
thinking and have proposed more child-friendly ways of phrasing the questions.73  
It has also been proposed that the oath requirement be scuttled in favor of a more 
developmentally appropriate requirement simply that the child agree that she “will” 
tell the truth.74 
In apparent sympathy with these suggestions, Congress passed the Victims’ 
Rights Act as a part of the Crime Control Act of 1990.75  Under this federal statute, 
a child witness is explicitly presumed to be competent in criminal cases in federal 
court.76  The statute provides that a court may examine a child witness as to 
competency only for compelling reasons found on the record, after a party has 
made a written motion and offer of proof of incompetency.77  The child’s age does 
not by itself justify such an examination.78 
                                                                                                                 
privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.  In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, 
except those on privilege.”  FED. R. EVID. 104 (Proposed Official Draft 2011). 
The court in its discretion may determine the form of inquiry to be used and the procedure to be 
followed in assessing a witness’s competence, including whether to conduct the inquiry outside the 
presence of the jury.  E.g., Odom, 736 F.2d at 109-12 (4th Cir. 1984) (no abuse of discretion in denying 
defense request for in camera determination of competency of approximately 30 prosecution witnesses; 
request was not made until during government’s case in chief).  The same standard of discretion applies 
in state courts.  See supra note 53. 
 72. Lyon, supra note 15, 1023-24 & nn.26-29; Raeder, supra note 3, 254 & nn.111-12. See also 
infra note 82. 
 73. See SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, CHILDREN IN THE COURTROOM: CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS 
AND JUDGES 8 (2009) (referring to the need to use  “developmentally appropriate questions” in 
competency determinations); Lyon, supra note 15, 1023-24, 1051-52.  See also infra notes 193, 196. 
 74. Lyon, supra note 15, 1058-63; Raeder, supra note 3, 254 & nn.114, 117-19.  See also Lucy S. 
McGough, Asking the Right Questions: Reviving the Voir Dire for Child Witnesses, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
557, 584-85 (1989) (proposing that court ask qualification questions “in words the child can 
comprehend”).  See generally John Gibeaut, Picture of Competency, 86 A.B.A. J. 24 (2000) (reporting 
on Lyon & Saywitz’s work); Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated Children’s 
Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. no. 16-24 (1999) (reporting on results 
of experiments and recommending asking children which of two pictured characters in a story is lying 
and which one will “get in trouble”). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006). 
 76. Id. § 3509(c)(2).  See also id. § 3509(c)(1)-(9).  A “child” is defined as a person under the age of 
eighteen.  Id. § 3509(a)(2).  This approach was advocated by Wigmore.  2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, § 
509.  It has attracted numerous advocates.  See Michelle L. Morris, Li’l People, Little Justice: The Effect 
of the Witness Competency Standard in California on Children in Sexual Abuse Cases, 22 J. JUV. L. 
113, 113 (2002) (proposing the adoption of this policy); see also infra note 79. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(3)-(4).  See United States v. Kelly, 436 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2006) (court 
had no duty to sua sponte inquire into competency of child witness); Tate ex rel Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 
346 F. Supp. 2d 536, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding “multiply disabled” six-year-old competent to 
testify, after examination in chambers); United States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155-56 
(D.N.D. 2003) (insufficient offer of proof was made in order to call nine-year-old’s competency into 
question), aff’d, 89 Fed. App’x. 595 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished table decision); United States v. 
Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for competency 
hearing). 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(4); Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56 (“[C]hildren are presumed to be 
competent to testify and a competency examination involving a child may be ordered only if 
‘compelling reasons’ exist.  It is well-established that as long as a witness has the capacity to testify 
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The statute requires treating children the same as adult witnesses, in that an 
adult witness is in effect presumed competent to testify.79  An adult witness merely 
takes an oath or affirms that he will testify truthfully.80  No inquiry is made into an 
adult’s mental competence, absent some showing by the opposing party that puts 
the witness’s testimonial competency into substantial doubt.81 
But the Victims’ Right Act does not explicitly address the oath or affirmation 
                                                                                                                 
truthfully, it is best left to the fact-finder to determine whether she, in fact, did so.”).  See, e.g., United 
States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 810 (2d Cir. 1994) (six-and-a-half year-old robbery victim testified). 
 79. FED. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules.”).  The rules cross-referenced specifically address only competence of interpreters, judges, 
and jurors, and the requirements of first-hand knowledge and an oath.  FED. R. EVID. 602-606; MD. 
RULE 5-601 (“Except as otherwise provided by law, every person is competent to be a witness.”); MD. 
RULE 5-601 advisory committee’s note (“Under this Rule, a witness is not generally incompetent by 
virtue of status.  A court could find, however, that because of insufficient memory, intelligence, or 
ability to express oneself, or inability to appreciate the need to tell the truth, a particular witness is not 
competent to testify as to certain matters.  See Rules 5-401 through 5-403, and 5-603.”).  See also supra 
note 56. 
 80. The witness may “affirm” her intention to testify truthfully, rather than swear to it.  E.g., FED. R. 
EVID. 603; MD. RULE 1-303 (“Except as provided in Rule 16-819(d)(3), whenever an oral oath is 
required by rule or law, the person making oath shall solemnly swear or affirm under the penalties of 
perjury that the responses given and statements made will be the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth.”); Thai, 29 F.3d at 812 (holding that affirmation was sufficient). 
 81. See, e.g., Anderson v. Franklin Cnty., 192 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1999) (no abuse of 
discretion in excluding testimony by eyewitness who was deaf and mute, and who could not read, write, 
or communicate with standard form of sign language; trial court stated that “the communication to and 
from [eyewitness] through the interpreters is not reliable,” that “[t]he accuracy of questions to and 
responses from [eyewitness] are highly suspect,” and that eyewitness’s severe limitation in 
communicating would render his testimony unreliable, confusing, and misleading); United States v. 
Garcia, 1990 WL 160187, at *2 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion to refuse to permit 
defense witness who did not understand English to testify without an interpreter); United States v. 
Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1984) (trial court refused to allow clerk to swear nine witnesses, 
residents of nursing home, because of their “obvious incapacity”; “five did not even respond to their 
names or show any ability to comprehend the questions directed to them or to give any testimony 
whatsoever”; “four gave such contradictory answers in direct and cross-examination that the district 
judge concluded that [they] were not competent”; the burden is on the opponent of a witness to show 
that the witness is incompetent); United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Every 
witness is presumed competent to testify, Fed. R. Evid. 601, unless it can be shown that the witness does 
not have personal knowledge of the matters about which he is to testify, that he does not have the 
capacity to recall, or that he does not understand the duty to testify truthfully.”); Huff v. White Motor 
Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293-94 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979) (“In the extreme case in which the witness’ 
incompetence is clear, the judge could exercise his balancing authority under Rule 403 to exclude the 
evidence.”); United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1975) (a witness is incompetent if he or 
she is not “capable of testifying in any meaningful fashion whatsoever”); United States v. Benn, 476 
F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Competency depends upon the witness’ capacity to observe, 
remember, and narrate as well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth.  It also requires an 
assessment of the potential prejudicial effects of allowing the jury to hear the testimony.  Mental 
retardation may be so severe, capabilities so impaired, and the testimony so potentially prejudicial that it 
should be barred completely by the judge.”); Tate, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (judge held competency 
hearing regarding “multiply disabled” six-year-old after finding “reasonable cause” to do so); Perry v. 
State, 848 A.2d 631, 636 n.4, 639 (Md. 2004) (party who knows that there is “a substantial question 
regarding [an opponent’s key witness’s] competency” should raise the issue before trial); Burgess v. 
State, 598 A.2d 830, 844-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (no abuse of discretion by trial court in nonjury 
trial to have conducted competency examination of tenth grader who functioned at third grade level); 3 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ¶ 601.03(1)(a) & (c) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
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requirement of Rule 603.  In practice, Rule 603’s requirement can impose a much 
greater obstacle for children than it does for adults.  Asking a young child to 
explain the abstract concepts of “truth” and “lies” can be like asking an adult to 
speak an incomprehensible foreign language.82  As a result, children who may have 
valuable and accurate knowledge of key facts can be found unable to meet Rule 
603’s criteria and thus precluded from testifying. 
Some prominent commentators, including Dean Wigmore, have urged that 
courts jettison this preliminary vetting of child witnesses, and simply let the child 
testify, trusting the jury—as with adult witnesses—to properly evaluate what 
weight to give the child’s testimony.83  Indeed both Great Britain and Canada have 
done away with any requirement that a child take an oath, make an affirmation, or 
show an understanding of a duty to tell the truth.84 
2.  State Courts 
Yet the longstanding practice in many American state jurisdictions remains 
that the trial judge interview a young child, usually out of the hearing of the jury, 
and often in chambers, before permitting the child to testify.85  Only if the judge, in 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 210-11 (Fla. 1988); see also State v. Superior Court ex rel. 
County of Pima, 719 P.2d 283, 286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (“A preschool-aged child generally does not 
understand abstract concepts such as oath, duty, truth or lie.  A child’s testimony may be rambling and 
disjointed, characterized by lack of continuity, spotty memory and an inability to discuss specific dates 
and times.  Those failings, however, go to the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given the 
testimony, not to competency.”). 
 83. Joseph A. Colquitt & Charles W. Gamble, From Incompetency to Weight and Credibility: The 
Next Step in an Historic Trend, 47 ALA. L. REV. 145, 146-52 (1995); see 1 KRAMER, supra note 28, § 
13.2; Morris, supra note 76; Reply Brief For Petitioner at *6, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), 
(No. 89-260), 1990 WL 10013037 (citing WIGMORE); see also J. G. A., The Competency of Children as 
Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REV. 358 (1953) (discussing authorities). 
Another prominent commentator has argued that our efforts should be focused on making the 
children available for cross-examination.  Mosteller, supra note 19. 
 84. See Kay Bussey, An International Perspective on Child Witnesses, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 
217-18 (Since 1933, Great Britain has permitted children to give unsworn testimony; Canada follows a 
similar approach.  In England, by virtue of a 1999 statute, all children of all ages are presumed 
competent to testify, and they need not be questioned as to their “knowledge of lies and untruths or their 
understanding of the duty to speak the truth”; but the judge may exclude the child’s testimony if, upon 
hearing it, the judge determines that the child “could not understand the questions and answer them in a 
comprehensible manner.”  Canada followed suit by statute in 2005, and requires of children under age 
14 only that they “promis[e] to tell the truth,” they need not swear or affirm, and “no assessment is 
undertaken of whether they understand the promise to tell the truth.”); Khristopher M. Gregoire, 
Comment, A Survey of International Hearsay Exceptions in Child Sex Abuse Cases: Balancing the 
Equities in Search of a More Pragmatic Rule, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 361 (2002) (discussing English law). 
 85. E.g., Matthews v. State, 666 A.2d 912, 919-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Myrna S. Raeder, 
Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio’s Efforts to Protect Children Without Eviscerating the 
Rights of Criminal Defendants—Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause 
Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 52-54 (1994) (citing Ohio cases).  See Kentucky 
v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (excluding criminal defendant, but not his counsel, from in-chambers 
hearing held to determine competency of two child witnesses violated neither due process nor his 
confrontation right, as exclusion did not interfere with his opportunity for effective cross-examination; 
also, after each child had testified on direct examination, defense counsel could have asked judge to 
reconsider earlier ruling that the child was competent); Laurie Shanks, Evaluating Children’s 
Competency to Testify: Developing a Rational Method to Assess a Young Child’s Capacity to Offer 
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his or her discretion,86 then determines that the child has sufficiently demonstrated 
the ability to observe, remember, and communicate the relevant facts87 and an 
understanding of the duty to tell the truth,88 will the judge allow the child to 
testify.89 
                                                                                                                 
Reliable Testimony in Cases Alleging Child Sex Abuse, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575 (2010) (urging a 
lengthier competency hearing for children, in which among other suggestions, their understanding of 
time should be explored).  Cf. Alice Dvoskin & Leonard S. Jacobson, Judicial Interview of Children in 
Custody Litigation, 27 MD. B.J. 44 (1994) (arguing in child custody litigation a judge’s interview of a 
child in chambers is limited in its effectiveness). 
 86. E.g., Robert v. State, 151 A.2d 737, 739 (Md. 1959); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, §§ 507-08; see 
also Lyon, supra note 15, at 1043 & nn.87-88 (stating the proposition that Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a) governs; preponderance of evidence standard applies). 
 87. E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895) (“That the [five-and-one-half-year-
old] boy was not by reason of his youth, as a matter of law, absolutely disqualified as a witness, is clear.  
While no one would think of calling as a witness an infant only two or three years old, there is no 
precise age which determines the question of competency.  This depends on the capacity and 
intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as his 
duty to tell the former.  The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the 
proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to 
any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of 
the obligation of an oath.”); John E.B. Myers, Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Trials, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 179 (“For a child to testify, the judge must be persuaded that the 
child possesses the ability to remember salient events, is able to communicate, understands the 
difference between truth and lies, and apprehends the duty to tell the truth.  Children as young as four 
possess the necessary moral and cognitive capacities to meet these requirements.”) (citations omitted); 
2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, §§ 505-06; see also Greg Tasker, Judge Orders Test of Autistic Girl’s 
Ability to Testify, BALT. SUN (Jan. 11, 1994), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-01-
11/news/1994011048_1_facilitated-communication-frederick-county-communication-method (Judge 
Cave of Montgomery County, Maryland, sitting in Frederick County Circuit Court, ordered that ten-
year-old autistic child be tested to see whether she could use “facilitated communication,” in which “an 
aide holds the girl’s hand or arm while she types on a computer keyboard”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 88. E.g., Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 525; Jones v. State, 275 A.2d 508, 513 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971); 
Hill v. Skinner, 79 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (finding it was proper to allow four-year-old, 
who had said if he did not tell the truth God would not love him, to testify); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 
66, § 62; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 50, §§ 505-06. 
 89. For examples of applications of the test, see Walters v. McCormick, 108 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 
(9th Cir. 1997) (finding no violation of due process or confrontation right in trial court’s admission of 
four-year-old’s testimony, when child may not have understood the oath and her testimony was riddled 
with inconsistencies, but defense had opportunity to develop these flaws on cross); People v. 
Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (three-year-old was properly found to be competent 
to testify); State v. Townsend, 635 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1994) (remanding for determination of whether two-
year-old’s out-of-court statement to her mother was reliable); Jones v. State, 980 A.2d 469, 472-76, 478-
80 (Md. 2009) (no clear error in trial court’s determination that six-year-old child was competent to 
testify, even though he gave some incorrect responses during voir dire); Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 231 
A.2d 702, 711 (Md. 1967) (finding eight-year-old incompetent; trial court properly struck her testimony, 
because it was apparent witness “either did not understand the questions as asked or did not know what 
she was saying when she attempted to answer them”); Freeny v. Freeny, 31 A. 304, 304-05 (Md. 1895) 
(affirming the decision that the twelve, ten, and seven-year olds were competent); Matthews, 666 A.2d 
at 919-20 (holding no abuse of discretion in finding four-year-old child competent to testify); Jones v. 
State, 510 A.2d 1091 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (reversing the trial court’s decision to allow the witness 
to testify because the child, who was four years old at time of alleged abuse, was shown to be 
incompetent); Williams v. State, 274 A.2d 403, 404-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (finding eight-year-
old competent); State v. Dwyer, 440 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 1989) (error to preclude three-and-a-half-year-
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A few states, however, have adopted Wigmore’s proposal to some degree.  As 
explained by the Colorado Supreme Court, a Colorado statute provides: 
In a criminal prosecution for a sexual offense, a child under ten years of age is 
considered competent to testify as a witness as long as the child is “able to 
describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age the events or facts 
respecting which the child is examined.”  § 13-90-106(1) (b) (II), 6A C.R.S. (1987 
& Supp. 1990).  This statutory requirement, of course, assumes that the child was 
physiologically capable of apprehending or perceiving the facts or events about 
which the child is to be examined.90  
Several other states have similar statutes.91  Ohio case law follows this approach, as 
well.92 
But many young children in numerous states continue to be incompetent to 
testify under traditional standards.  The concern that the key witness will be held to 
be incompetent inevitably prevents prosecutors and other child advocates from 
being able to purse innumerable cases,93 especially when they cannot offer the 
child’s out-of-court statements into evidence. 
Even if the child testifies, the child’s testimony alone may be insufficient to 
persuade the fact-finder.  A young child’s trial testimony may lack the probative 
value of his initial statements, and the inadmissibility of the child’s earlier 
statements may mean the loss of the case. Though this may be true of adult 
witnesses, as well, there are special challenges for children. 
                                                                                                                 
old child witness’s testimony, if child could understand the significance of telling the truth, even if she 
had difficulty understanding questions or remembering, or was confused and inattentive); In Interest of 
CB, 749 P.2d 267 (Wyo. 1988) (no plain error under Wyo. R. Evid. 601 in allowing three-year-old child 
to testify after court held a competency hearing).  See State v. Campbell, 579 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (Mont. 
1978) (trial court should have determined whether four-year-old witness was able to testify at trial, 
which he would be if he could be shown to “perceive correct impressions of the facts he observed, to 
remember those impressions, to communicate what he saw, and to understand his duty to tell the truth”; 
instead, trial court had committed reversible error by admitting child’s out-of-court statements that did 
not fall within a hearsay exception).  See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 31.06; Gary B. Melton, 
Children’s Competency to Testify, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1981); John E.B. Myers, The Testimonial 
Competence of Children, 25 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 287 (1986-87); Jeff C. Woods, Children Can Be 
Witnesses, Too: A Discussion of the Preparation and Utilization of Child-Witnesses in Courts-Martial, 
ARMY LAW. 2 (Mar. 1983); Carol J. Miller, Annotation, Instructions to Jury as to Credibility of Child’s 
Testimony in Criminal Case, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1196 (1984 & Supp. 2011); Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, 
Witnesses: Child Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R.4th 369, §§ 31-32 (1988 & Supp. 2011) (listing cases 
where three- and four-year-olds were found competent to testify); Annotation, Competency of Young 
Child as Witness in Civil Case, 81 A.L.R.2d 386 (1962). 
 90. People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 519 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); see also People v. District Court 
ex rel.  Summit Cnty., 791 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). 
 91. See ALA. CODE 15-25-3(c) (1995) (“[A] child victim of a physical offense, sexual offense, or 
sexual exploitation, shall be considered a competent witness. . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 54-86h 
(2009) (“any child who is a victim of assault, sexual assault or abuse shall be competent to testify 
without prior qualification”); MO. ANN. STAT. 491.060(2) (1996) (excepting from usual qualification 
requirements “a child under the age of ten who is alleged to be a victim under chapter 565, 566 in 568”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-410 (2008 Repl. Vol.) (“A child victim of sexual abuse under the age of ten is a 
competent witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial proceeding.  
The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility of the testimony”). 
 92. See State v. Silverman, 906 N.E.2d 427, 434, 438 (Ohio 2009)  
 93. Raeder, supra note 3, at 239 & n.3.  See also Lyon, supra note 15. 
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C.  Ineffectiveness of Young Children’s Testimony 
Children are often particularly ineffective witnesses.94  Frequently this is 
because of the child’s fear of the opposing party or of the trial court setting or 
both,95 so that the child gives only halting or incomplete responses to questions.96  
Additionally, as when adult victims of domestic abuse are asked to testify against 
their abusers,97 the child victim may be either reluctant to testify98 or even recant 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Ehrhardt & Mccabe, supra note 10, at 1 (“Due to their age, immaturity, and intimidation of the 
courtroom, children are frequently poor witnesses when called to testify at trial.”). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized this deficiency, noting: 
At trial A.T., then 6 ½ years old, was the Government’s first witness.  For the most part, 
her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of leading 
questions.  Cross-examination took place over two trial days.  The defense asked A.T. 
348 questions.  On the first day A.T. answered all the questions posed to her on general, 
background subjects.  The next day there was no testimony, and the prosecutor met with 
A.T.  When cross-examination of A.T. resumed, she was questioned about those 
conversations but was reluctant to discuss them.  Defense counsel then began questioning 
her about the allegations of abuse, and it appears she was reluctant at many points to 
answer.  As the trial judge noted, however, some of the defense questions were imprecise 
or unclear.  The judge expressed his concerns with the examination of A.T., observing 
there were lapses of as much as 40-55 seconds between some questions and the answers 
and that on the second day of examination, the witness seemed to be losing concentration.  
The trial judge stated, “We have a very difficult situation here.” 
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1995).  See, e.g., United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 
1443, 1445 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he five-year-old was called to the stand, but because of her age and 
obvious fright, she was unable to testify meaningfully”; she was “frightened and uncommunicative, 
especially when asked questions relating to sexual abuse.”); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 
(8th Cir. 1980) (“At trial Lucy [the nine-year-old victim] was unable to repeat the statements she had 
made to Officer Marshall and Dr. Hopkins although she was able to provide some facts to support her 
earlier statements.”); Bowers, 801 P.2d at 514 (“The prosecuting attorney asked K.B., who was then 
four and one-half years old, very basic questions, such as her name, age, and whether she could identify 
her parents in the courtroom.  The child answered these questions but only with great reluctance and by 
nodding.”); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“It has been estimated that 
some 400,000 children are sexually abused every year in the United States.  These cases present special 
problems of proof that make their prosecution especially difficult.  The most obvious difficulty is the 
fact that usually the only witness to the crime is a young child who may not be able to testify adequately 
about what occurred.  The courtroom setting can be intimidating to the child attempting to recount the 
incident of abuse, and cross-examination is likely to confuse the child witness.  A child may retract a 
claim of sexual abuse because of the guilt or fear caused by the event.  Moreover, when the perpetrator 
is a friend or family member, the child may even fear the consequences for the offender.  The child may 
simply refuse to retell his or her story in open court, and sometimes parents will decline to prosecute the 
case rather than subject the child to what amounts to yet another trying ordeal.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  See generally 1-2 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES §§ 
1.2-.7, 1.29, 6.1-.22 (3d ed. 1997) (describing and explaining difficulties faced by child witnesses). 
 95. E.g., Lawson v. State, 865 A.2d 617, 631 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (“‘[A] young child can be 
easily intimidated into not testifying about [such] offenses. . . .’  State v. Benwire, 98 S.W.3d 618, 624 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003).”); State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765, 769 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (“[C]hildren are often 
ineffective witnesses at trial because they are intimidated by the accused, who is often a parent or 
relative, by the trial process, or both.”); Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a 
“Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 
1015 (2007); Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum 
of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 157-61 (1988) (discussing intimidation of children). 
 96. See supra note 94. 
 97. See generally Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005). 
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her earlier reports of abuse.99 
These problems are compounded because, as other legal commentators and 
social scientists have pointed out, the manner of examination at trial is 
developmentally inappropriate and confusing to children.100  On cross-examination, 
a child may often be asked questions beyond the reasoning process appropriately 
expected for a person of his age.  Such a confused child will give more inconsistent 
responses than would a similarly situated adult.  Developmentally delayed 
(mentally retarded) adults have the same problems as do young children.101 
Children’s credibility may be attacked on the ground that they did not 
promptly report the alleged abuse, giving rise to the inference that it never 
happened.  Jurors may not understand that, like adult victims of domestic violence, 
child abuse victims may be slow to disclose the abuse due to loyalty to dependency 
on, or love or fear of their abuser.102  Delays in reporting also may result from the 
child having been made to promise to keep it as “our secret”103 or from the child 
having been threatened—such as: “If you tell, something very bad will happen to 
your mommy.”104  Less like adult victims, children’s failure to recognize that an act 
such as sexually-motivated fondling by an adult is “wrong” may result in delayed 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See supra note 94. 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Bahe, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1303 (D.N.M. 1998) (child recanted; 
evidence was held insufficient to support a conviction); Lawson, 865 A.2d at 631 (“For that reason and 
others, ‘as a general phenomenon, child abuse victims frequently recant their initial reports of abuse.’  
Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 210, 636 A.2d 50 (1994).”), rev’d on other grounds, 886 A.2d 876 
(Md. 2005); Raeder, supra note 3, at 250 & nn.85-89. 
 100. See Frank E. Vandervort, A Search for the Truth or Trial by Ordeal: When Prosecutors Cross-
Examine Adolescents How Should Courts Respond?, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 335, 359-67 (2010) (applying 
Wigmore’s observation that a cross-examiner “may make the truth appear like falsehood” to propose 
that judges should curb unfair examination of juvenile defendants, in part because “legal professionals 
overestimate the linguistic abilities of children and youths”).  See also supra note 73 and accompanying 
text. 
 101. State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255, 262-63 (Fla. 2006). 
 102. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 443-45 (2008); Thomas D. Lyon, Abuse Disclosure: What 
Adults Can Tell, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 20 (discussing research confirming that “most sexual abuse 
is not disclosed during childhood, and that . . . disclosure is difficult even for older respondents, and 
particularly so in cases of intrafamilial abuse”); Lyon, supra note 15, at 1070 & nn.176-78; Raeder, 
supra note 3, at 249 & nn.81-83; CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY, AND DENIAL (Margaret 
Ellen Pipe et al. eds., 2007) (discussing scientific research regarding children’s disclosure of their 
having been sexually abused and resulting legal, clinical, and policy implications).  See also United 
States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444 (8th Cir. 1986) (“According to the psychologist, it frequently 
takes a long time for children to share what is really going on and they may then do so in stages, telling 
a little more each time.”); JAYCEE DUGARD, A STOLEN LIFE (2011) (author, who was kidnapped at age 
eleven for eighteen years and repeatedly raped, did not leave her abusers when she had the opportunity, 
because they had told her she could not survive without them). 
 103. See Paul Wagland & Kay Bussey, Factors that Facilitate and Undermine Children’s Beliefs 
about Truth Telling, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 639 (2005) (investigating effect on children’s truthfulness 
about an adult, when the adult has sworn them to secrecy). 
 104. See United States v. Harrison, 296 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 2002) (victim said that for years she 
did not tell anyone about defendant’s sexual assaults on her, because he “had told her not to and had 
threatened to kill her if she did”); United States v. Hollis, 54 M.J. 809, 813 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) 
(defendant, victim’s biological father, told her he would go to jail if she told anyone). 
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reporting of the event.105 
Particularly when there is a long delay between the child’s initial report of 
abuse and the trial, memory problems may also arise.106  Like an adult, a child’s 
memory may have faded with the passage of time.107  Unlike adults, however, 
young children may not have recognized the abuse as aberrational so as to ascribe 
special importance to it at the time it occurred; thus, not having recognized it as 
traumatic, they may not have related it to themselves or others repeatedly in the 
interim—such a practice by a similarly situated adult would help to reinforce and 
keep the memory alive.108 
When a young child is the victim of an alleged crime, our justice system is put 
to its severest test.  Beyond cavil we must be scrupulously fair to the person 
accused of abuse.  In criminal cases we apply a presumption of innocence and 
impose a burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt because we do not want 
to convict an innocent person.  If the person accused of abuse is a parent, we do not 
want to lightly terminate parental rights. 
Nor, however, do we want to create a group of helpless victims whom a 
perpetrator could “safely” harm, whom we could not protect, and to whom we 
could never offer recourse.109  If the child is unable to testify at trial—or is 
permitted to testify, but is unable to testify effectively—the need for the fact-finder 
to hear, and the probative value of, the child’s earlier statements is greatly 
heightened.  The question arises: what parameters does the Constitution establish as 
to the admissibility of children’s out-of-court statements when they either cannot 
testify, or cannot effectively testify, at trial? 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Lyon, supra note 15, at 1070 & n.176.  See State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 673 (N.J. 1988) 
(“Young children . . . do not necessarily regard a sexual encounter as shocking or unpleasant, and 
frequently relate such incidents to a parent or relative in a matter-of-fact manner”).  Developmental 
psychology may be important here, too, to the child’s understanding of the event.  Funk, supra note 19, 
at 957-59, 964-65.  See also infra notes 167 and text accompanying note 198. 
 106. State v. Massengill, 62 P.3d 354, 358-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (child was two-and-one-half 
years old at time of abuse and out-of-court statement, but had no memory at trial when five years old); 
State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (“In cases of child sexual abuse, there may 
often be a substantial delay between the alleged crime and the child’s statement and another substantial 
delay between the statement and the time of trial.”); Natalie R. Troxel et al., Child Witnesses in 
Criminal Court, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 159. 
 107. State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765, 769 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (“[Y]oung children’s memories fade with 
the passage of time.”). 
 108. See infra note 201. 
 109. See, e.g., Connally, supra note 15, at 1; C.M. Mahady-Smith, Commentary, The Young Victim 
as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 721-22 (1985) 
(reporting the dropping of a sexual abuse case due to inadmissibility of a child’s statements identifying 
his abuser, when the three-year old boy had gonorrhea of the mouth, penis, and rectum); Mosteller, 
supra note 19; Jackie Powder, Judge’s Ban of Social Worker’s Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets 
Investigators, BALT. SUN (Aug. 9, 1992), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-08-
09/news/1992222125_1_child-abuse-social-worker-charges-of-child (the stepfather of a five-year old 
Maryland girl who contracted gonorrhea was acquitted when the State was not permitted to prove that 
the child had described to a police officer her stepfather’s having had sexual intercourse with her). 
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III.  THE CONFRONTATION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: FOR DUE PROCESS 
PURPOSES, THE RELIABILITY OF AN EARLIER STATEMENT IS NOT DETERMINED BY 
TESTIMONIAL COMPETENCE AT TIME OF TRIAL 
The Constitution’s confrontation and due process clauses establish the limits 
within which the rules of evidence may operate. 
A.  The Confrontation Clause 
In a criminal trial the defendant has a constitutional right to confront the 
“witnesses against him.”110  If a child called by the prosecution is—through no 
fault of the child’s—an ineffective witness at trial, but she does testify and is 
subject to cross-examination, the accused’s confrontation right will have been fully 
met.111  Under Crawford v. Washington and its progeny Davis v. Washington, the 
confrontation clause applies only to “testimonial” statements, as only they are 
considered to be of “witnesses against” the accused within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment.112 
If the child does not testify at the trial, but he has made a prior testimonial 
statement that inculpates the accused, the accused’s confrontation right will 
exclude the child’s earlier statement (unless either the accused had an earlier 
opportunity to cross-examine the child about the statement113 or the accused has 
forfeited or waived her confrontation right114).  But what restraints the Constitution 
imposes, post Crawford, on the admission of a child’s earlier, “nontestimonial”115 
statements has been less frequently addressed. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See supra note 18. 
 111. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38, 68 (2004); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 
557 (1988). 
 112. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006).  See also supra note 19. 
 113. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  See, e.g., State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255, 268 (Fla. 2006) (holding 
statutory hearsay exception unconstitutional as applied to testimonial out-of-court statement by mentally 
disabled adult to police officer, but constitutional as applied to nontestimonial statement to teacher); 
State v. Ortega, 175 P.3d 929, 930 (N.M. 2007) (holding statement to Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
(SANE) to be testimonial).  The line between testimonial and nontestimonial remains unclear and 
difficult to define.  In Hosty, for example, Judge Pariente, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
would not have reached the question, but did not embrace the conclusion that the statements to the 
teacher were nontestimonial; inter alia, the teacher had a statutory duty to report the out-of-court 
statement to law enforcement.  Hosty, 944 So. 2d at 265-66.  Judge Quince, dissenting, joined by Judge 
Aistead, would have found the statements to the teacher testimonial.  Ortega, 175 P.3d at 969-70.  See 
generally Mosteller, supra note 19. 
 114. See supra note 21. 
 115. Abuse victims’ statements were found to be nontestimonial in several cases.  E.g., State v. 
Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (three-year-old’s response when a nurse 
practitioner asked her if anything had happened was not testimonial hearsay); State v. Vaught, 682 
N.W.2d 284, 292 (Neb. 2004) (no error in admitting doctor’s testimony to nontestifying child’s 
statement to examining physician); State v. Ladner, 644 S.E.2d 684, 689-90 (S.C. 2007) (and cases cited 
therein); State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 90, 92 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the mostly 
spontaneous statements of a three-year-old rape victim [who the parties stipulated was incompetent to 
testify] to her mother and a family friend were nontestimonial, when the witnesses to the statements 
were not acting on behalf of law enforcement and an objective declarant would have had no reason to 
believe the statements would be used in court); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005) (no confrontation clause violation in admitting, under Wash. Evid. R. 803(a)(4), the statement of a 
100 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
B.  The Due Process Clause: “Reliability” 
After the March 2004 decision in Crawford, no confrontation right issue can 
arise if a child’s pretrial “nontestimonial” statements are admitted into evidence.116  
But a due process violation will result if a verdict is based on unreliable hearsay.117  
In 2011 the United States Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice 
Sotomayor in Michigan v. Bryant, averted to the newly enhanced role of the due 
process clause.118  This author has previously argued that appropriate 
implementation of the post-Crawford due process standard requires that the trial 
court examine the reliability of proffered hearsay, as to which the standards of Ohio 
v. Roberts119 and Idaho v. Wright120 remain applicable (until and unless they are 
overruled).121  Can a child who does not understand, as an adult would, abstract 
concepts (such as “truth” and “falsehood”) have made a reliable out-of-court 
statement?122  The answer is “yes, perhaps.”  Wright and Roberts require that in 
                                                                                                                 
two-year-and-five-month-old child to physician that defendant had hit him; child was incompetent to 
testify at trial). 
 116. See Davis, 547 U.S. 813; see also supra note 19. 
 117. See Nunley v. State, 916 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind. 2010) (reversing child molestation convictions 
on two counts as to which the child victim’s unreliable out-of-court statements provided the only 
supporting evidence); Miller v. State, 531 N.E.2d 466, 470-71 (Ind. 1988) (under all circumstances, 
reversible error to admit unreliable “tender years” statement); State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 475 
(Ohio 1988) (Wright, J., dissenting) (based on “procedural due process protections,” dissent would have 
reversed convictions based on hearsay that did not properly qualify for admission); State v. Karpenski, 
971 P.2d 553 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (because under facts of case, child victim was neither competent to 
testify at trial nor competent when he made numerous inconsistent and fantastic out-of-court statements, 
it was reversible error to permit child to testify and to admit his out-of-court statements); see also supra 
note 25. 
 118. Michigan v. Bryant, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (2011) (“Of course the 
Confrontation Clause is not the only bar to admissibility of hearsay statements at trial.  State and federal 
rules of evidence prohibit the introduction of hearsay, subject to exceptions.  Consistent with those rules, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to 
admission of, for example, unreliable evidence.”).  See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 
(1996) (plurality opinion) (erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due 
process violation); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in 
accordance with due process of law” is the “standard” by which to “test federal and state rules of 
evidence.”). 
 119. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 120. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 121. See McLain, supra note 24, at 377, 416-30. 
 122. Regarding the reliability of children’s testimony, see generally Roger V. Burton, Honesty and 
Dishonesty, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 173 
(Tom Lickona ed. 1976); Gilstrap et al., supra note 13; J. J. Haugaard et al., Children’s Definitions of 
the Truth and Their Competency in Legal Proceedings, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253 (1991); Thomas 
L. Henry, Child Abuse Prosecutions—The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Viewpoint, MD. B.J., Mar. 1985, 
at 9; Barbara Van Oss Marin et al., The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses: A Comparison of 
Children and Adults on Eyewitness Tasks, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979); MYERS, supra note 94; 
Colin H. Murray, Child-Witness Examination, 31 LITIG. 16 (2005); Faye A. Silas, Would A Kid Lie?, 71 
A.B.A. J. 17 (1985); Charles B. Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1962); Alan 
D. Strasser, Child Witnesses, 14 LITIG. 30 (1988); Wagland & Bussey, supra note 103.  See also supra 
notes 50, 72, 82. 
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gauging reliability of an out-of-court statement we look at the attendant 
circumstances at the time the statement was made.123 
C.  Analysis of the Reliability of the Out-of-Court Statement Is Separate and 
Different from the Question of Competency to Testify at Trial 
Although the jurisdictions are divided, numerous courts have recognized, both 
before and after Crawford, that the determination of whether a child’s pretrial 
statement is reliable requires a separate and different analysis from whether the 
child is competent to testify at trial.124  Most significantly, the United States 
Supreme Court embraced this proposition in Idaho v. Wright.125  The appropriate 
standard for determining the reliability of a pretrial statement is the declarant’s 
“ability to receive, retain and relate accurate impressions of an occurrence” at the 
time of the statement.126  A child declarant’s testimonial competence or lack of 
competence at trial is not determinative; it may be only “a factor” in that 
calculation.127 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See infra Part III.C. 
 124. E.g., People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 519 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“A finding, for example, that 
a very young child is incompetent to testify because of the child’s reluctance to answer questions in a 
formal courtroom environment does not necessarily impair any particularized guarantees of reliability 
that otherwise inhere in a child’s hearsay statement.”); People v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1087 
(Colo. 1989); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 211 (Fla. 1989); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 72 n.7 (Ind. 1987); Embry v. Holly, 429 A.2d 251, 
267-69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (identity of anonymous phone callers [and thus, this author posits, 
their mental capacity] was not necessary for admission of their out-of-court statements under state of 
mind exception to hearsay rule; only requirement was that statement was made with “apparent 
sincerity”), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 442 A.2d 966 (Md. 1982); State v. Waddell, 
527 S.E.2d 644, 650 (N.C. 2000); State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 472-73 (Ohio 1988); State v. 
Fisher, 108 P.2d 1262, 1266, 1270 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“Although Ty [three-and one-half- years-old 
at time of hearing] was not competent to testify as a witness, he was competent [at two years and five 
months] to understand that he had been hurt and to say who had injured him.”).  But see Huff v. White 
Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1979) (proponent must prove declarant’s mental capacity 
by preponderance of the evidence, to trial judge’s satisfaction); Stoddard v. State, 887 A.2d 564, 584, 
600-601 (Md. 2005) (“outside the realm of excited or spontaneous utterances or statutory admissibility,” 
hearsay is inadmissible if the declarant would have been incompetent to testify); Raeder,, supra note 95, 
at 1011-12  (accepting the rule of King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.), as “confirm[ing] 
that an incompetent child’s hearsay cannot be introduced because the child could not be a witness at 
trial,” and treating excited utterances as sui generis because their reliability is not premised on child’s 
ability to discern truth from a lie); Mosteller, supra note 19, at 986-87 nn.257-59; Eric Yamamoto, 
Address at the AALS Evid. Section Panel (Jan. 7, 2000) (citing a possible biological reason for strong 
memories of traumatic events: release of neurochemicals when experiencing trauma) (author’s notes on 
file with author). 
 125. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).  See also infra Part III.C.1. 
 126. State v. Gribble, 804 P.2d 634, 642 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (Forrest, J., concurring) (referring to 
“the ability to receive, retain and relate accurate impressions of an occurrence” as the appropriate 
standard).  See also State v. Nunley, 916 N.E.2d 712, 717-19 (Ind. 2009) (finding that child’s 
spontaneous statements made shortly after the event were reliable, but her statements made in a 
videotaped interview more than a year later were not reliable).  Cf. Shanks, supra note 85, at 584 
(referring to various states’ requirements as to testimonial competency “to evaluate the child’s mental 
capacity at the time of the occurrence in question”). 
 127. State v. Doe, 719 P.2d 554, 558 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (“The child’s lack of competency may 
be a factor [as to reliability of her out-of-court statement], but it is not controlling.”).  Accord State v. 
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This result takes into account principles of developmental psychology.  A 
young child may be able, for example, to accurately relate recent events, but not 
events of a long time ago.  In contrast, an Alzheimer’s patient might have the 
opposite capacity.  What matters are the circumstances and the declarant’s capacity 
at the time of making the statement.128 
1.  Idaho v. Wright 
The United States Supreme Court held in Idaho v. Wright that corroborating 
evidence could not be considered in determining the reliability of a hearsay 
statement under the then applicable Ohio v. Roberts (pre-Crawford) confrontation 
clause jurisprudence.129  The statements at issue in Wright had been made by a two-
and-one-half year old child regarding her stepfather’s sexual abuse of her and of 
her older sister and had been admitted under Idaho’s residual hearsay exception, 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24).130  Roberts required a showing of “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness,” which the Wright majority held, in an opinion by 
Justice O’Connor, “must . . . be drawn from the totality of circumstances that 
surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy of belief.”131 
The Court “assume[d] without deciding” that the little girl was “unavailable” 
to testify,132 and cited with approval various lower courts’ consideration of “a 
number of factors”133 regarding the reliability of such a child declarant’s out-of-
court statements: 
The state and federal courts have identified a number of factors that we think 
properly relate to whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child 
sexual abuse cases are reliable.  See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 201, 
735 P.2d 801, 811 (1987) (spontaneity and consistent repetition); Morgan v. 
Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1988) (mental state of the declarant); State v. 
Sorenson, 143 Wis.2d 226, 246, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85 (1988) (use of terminology 
unexpected of a child of similar age); State v. Kuone, 243 Kan. 218, 221-222, 757 
P.2d 289, 292-293 (1988) (lack of motive to fabricate).  Although these cases 
                                                                                                                 
Superior Court, 719 P.2d 283, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1987 
(Colo. 1989) (trial court wrongly ruled that, because child was incompetent to testify at trial, her 
statements made when she was four years old were necessarily unreliable); State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 
255, 260-61 (Fla. 2005); State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 956 (Fla. 1994); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 
206, 211 (Fla. 1988); People v. Smith, 604 N.E.2d 858, 869-71 (Ill. 1992); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 
656, 659-62 (Minn. 1990); State v. Waddell, 527 S.E.2d 644, 650-51 (N.C. 2000); State v. Rogers, 428 
S.E.2d 220, 224 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Ladner, 644 S.E.2d 684, 692 (S.C. 2007); State v. C.J., 
63 P.3d 765, 770 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).  See also infra text accompanying note 137 (quoting Wright). 
Of course, this standard is not applicable if the particular rule or statute recognizing an exception 
to the rule against hearsay requires that the declarant be available to testify at trial.  See, e.g., Peters v. 
State, 424 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (Georgia’s tender years statute requires that the child 
declarant be available to testify at trial). 
 128. Cf. State v. Uhler, 608 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (noting that competency to 
testify is determined by competency at time of trial, not at time of incident). 
 129. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990).  
 130. Id. at 816-17. 
 131. Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132. Id. at 816. 
 133. Id. at 821. 
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(which we cite for the factors they discuss and not necessarily to approve the 
results that they reach) involve the application of various hearsay exceptions to 
statements of child declarants, we think the factors identified also apply to whether 
such statements bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under the 
Confrontation Clause.  These factors are, of course, not exclusive, and courts have 
considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors. . . .  [T]he 
unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was 
particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. 134 
Post-Crawford, the confrontation clause analysis has changed,135 and these factors 
are relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements for purposes of compliance with 
the due process clause.136 
The Wright Court’s emphasis on the time “when the statement was made” is of 
supreme importance to the due process analysis.  Most significant for the thesis of 
this article is the following passage in the Court’s opinion: 
Finally, we reject respondent’s contention that the younger daughter’s out-of-court 
statements in this case are per se unreliable, or at least presumptively unreliable, 
on the ground that the trial court found the younger daughter incompetent to testify 
at trial.  First, respondent’s contention rests upon a questionable reading of the 
record in this case.  The trial court found only that the younger daughter was “not 
capable of communicating to the jury.”  Although Idaho law provides that a child 
witness may not testify if he “appear[s] incapable of receiving just impressions of 
the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly,” the trial 
court in this case made no such findings.  Indeed, the more reasonable inference is 
that, by ruling that the statements were admissible under Idaho’s residual hearsay 
exception, the trial court implicitly found that the younger daughter, at the time 
she made the statements, was capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and 
of relating them truly.  In addition, we have in any event held that the 
Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior 
statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of 
trial.  Although such inability might be relevant to whether the earlier hearsay 
statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of 
exclusion would not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause, but would also hinder States in their own “enlightened development in the 
law of evidence.”137 
The rules of evidence provide the initial barrier to admissibility of evidence.  Even 
if evidence has jumped those hurdles, a resulting verdict will not survive a 
constitutional due process challenge if it is based on untrustworthy evidence.138  
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 821-22 (emphasis added). 
 135. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (the confrontation clause 
“commands that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination”), with Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (confrontation clause is satisfied if hearsay 
is reliable either because it falls within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or if “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” of the out-of-statement are shown). 
 136. McLain, supra note 24, at 421-30. 
 137. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824-25 (citations omitted; emphasis added).  See also State v. Uhler, 608 
N.E.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (applying Ohio Evid. R. 601(a), containing language 
identical to that of Idaho R. Evid. 601(a), and finding no error in admission of nine-year-old victim’s 
testimony). 
 138. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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The Wright Court (although speaking then in terms of the confrontation clause, 
which at that time was applied to both testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements)139 explicitly declined to equate inability to testify at trial with an 
inability to have made a trustworthy pretrial statement. 
2. General Caveats from the Rules of Evidence 
In order to clear the initial hurdle of the rules of evidence, proof of an out-of-
court statement must meet multiple criteria.  For an out-of-court statement to be 
admissible under a non-hearsay category under Rule 801(d) or a hearsay exception 
under Rule 803, 804, or 807, its proponent must show that the foundation 
requirements for the category or exception have been met.  Unless a particular 
hearsay exception requires that an out-of-court statement have been under oath (as 
does Rule 804(b)(1) regarding former testimony),140 oath-worthiness of the 
declarant at the time of making the statement need not be shown by the proponent 
of the statement.  The proponent, however, must provide proof sufficient to support 
a finding that the circumstances lent themselves to the declarant’s having had first-
hand knowledge of that of which he or she spoke.141  The statements must be 
excluded under Rule 602 if the court finds that the declarant lacked first-hand 
knowledge.142 
Additionally, the court should exclude proffered evidence under Rule 403 if it 
clearly lacks any probative value, as its admission would be misleading and 
confusing to the fact-finder.143  If an out-of-court statement was made by a person 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See supra note 135. 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 141. FED. R. EVID. 602.  The advisory committee’s note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803 states: “In a 
hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with 
the requirement of first-hand knowledge.  It may appear from his statement or be inferable from 
circumstances.  See Rule 602.”  FED. R. EVID. 803, advisory committee’s note.  See also Greene v. B.F. 
Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion in 
admitting crashing helicopter pilot’s statement to pilot-in-command that “I think my gyro just quit”; 
statement was not unduly speculative, as pilot could see data in the cockpit regarding the gyroscopes in 
the nose of the helicopter.); Parker v. State, 778 A.2d 1096, 1103-07 (Md. 2001) (finding no abuse of 
discretion to admit out-of-court excited utterances of unnamed declarants, where the content of the 
statements and the surrounding circumstances showed that declarants had first-hand knowledge). 
 142. See Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (ordering habeas writ to be granted when 
state court erroneously admitted evidence of an anonymous 911 call, whether as a present sense 
impression or an excited utterance, when material facts omitted by caller supported finding that caller 
was engaging in conjecture and lacked first-hand knowledge); Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1372-
74 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in excluding statement, when there were affirmative 
indications that the declarant lacked first-hand knowledge); Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 
1182, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) (ruling that proof of statement of unidentified bystander was inadmissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) or (2), because trial court could not determine whether declarant 
had first-hand knowledge); Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(concluding there was insufficient evidence that unidentified declarant had had personal knowledge), 
aff’d, 895 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1990); Pillard v. Chesapeake S.S. Co., 92 A. 1040, 1040-41 (Md. 1915) 
(finding hearsay statement was properly excluded when, inter alia, there was “nothing to show that . . . 
[the declarant] had or was in a position to have had knowledge of his own upon the matter.”). 
 143. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides in pertinent part: “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .”  FED. R. EVID. 403.  As restyled effective December 11, 2011, 
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whom the opponent shows to have lacked sufficient mental capacity to have made 
a rational statement at the time of its utterance, the court should exclude the 
statement under Rule 403.144 
3.  Many Lower Courts’ Holdings as to Both Child and Adult Declarants are 
Consistent with Idaho v. Wright 
The reliability of the out-of-court statement requires a separate analysis from 
the question of competency of the declarant to testify at trial.  As the Wright Court 
stated, there is no per se bar to admitting into evidence pretrial statements of a 
person who is incapable of testifying at trial.145  The inability of the declarant to 
communicate at the time of trial merely “might be relevant to whether the earlier 
hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”146  
Wright is in accord on this point with the better reasoned lower courts’ decisions 
involving both child and adult declarants.  The out-of-court statement’s reliability 
must be evaluated under the circumstances existing at the time it was made, not 
under the circumstances existing at the time of trial. 
Just as competency at an earlier time does not make one competent to testify at 
the time of trial, incompetency at trial does not necessarily make one’s earlier 
statements incompetent.  Competency is a question of fitness to testify at the time 
of trial, and is neither met nor not met by fitness at another time.147  Cases 
involving adult declarants include those finding out-of-court statements that fell 
within hearsay exceptions to have been properly admitted if the statements had 
                                                                                                                 
Rule 403 reads: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 403 (Proposed Official Draft 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 144. See United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Another factor to consider in 
determining whether [the child victim’s] hearsay statements contain particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness is the reason for [the child’s] inability to testify at trial.  While the Confrontation Clause 
‘does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to 
communicate to the jury at the time of trial,’ the declarant’s inability to communicate may be relevant to 
whether the hearsay statements possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Should the 
district court determine that [the child] did not know the difference between the truth and a lie, this 
finding would have an obvious impact on whether [her] hearsay statements were trustworthy.”) 
(citations omitted); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that admission of 
videotaped interview of three-year-old child victim, who the state court determined to be incompetent to 
testify at trial, and that was not shown to have adequate indicia of reliability, was violation of the 
accused’s confrontation right and reversible error); Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846, 849-50 (D. 
Kan. 1992) (finding that the state court violated defendant’s confrontation rights by admitting out-of-
court statements of mentally retarded teenaged victim when, inter alia, the preliminary hearing judge 
found declarant unavailable to testify on ground that she could not discern the truth from falsehood); 
State v. Karpenski, 971 P.2d 553, 563-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the child victim was 
neither competent to testify at trial nor competent when he made numerous inconsistent and fantastic 
out-of-court statements; reversible error to permit child to testify and to admit his out-of-court 
statements); see also supra note 117. 
 145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 146. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824-25 (1990). 
 147. See United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 109-12 (4th Cir. 1984) (indicating that witnesses’ 
abilities at trial, rather than at preliminary hearing, are critical). 
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been made at a time before trial when the declarant had been cogent, but by the 
time of trial had become insane or otherwise mentally incompetent.148 
Cases from numerous lower courts have likewise affirmed the admission, 
under various hearsay exceptions, of children’s out-of-court statements without the 
children having been qualified as competent to testify at trial.  The admission of 
such statements under the hearsay exception for excited utterances (Rule 803(2)) 
has been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court;149 the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,150 the Fourth Circuit151 and the 
Eighth Circuit;152 and state appellate courts of Idaho,153 Maryland,154 North 
Carolina,155 Ohio156 and South Carolina.157 
The United States Supreme Court,158 the Ninth Circuit,159 and courts in 
Nebraska,160 New Mexico161 and North Carolina162 have reached the same result as 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Contee v. State, 184 A.2d 823, 825-26 (Md. 1962) (ruling prior testimony admissible of 
declarant who had subsequently become insane); Johnson v. State, 492 A.2d 1343, 1345-48 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1985) (holding admissible excited utterance of elderly victim, who was incompetent at trial, 
but who had been “apparently capable of maintaining herself in her own apartment” at the time of the 
statement; appellate court stated that a “hard and fast rule” would be inappropriate); Hensley v. Rich, 
380 A.2d 252, 255 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding out-of-court declarant’s statements were “cogent, 
knowledgeable, and clearly responsive” and did not indicate incompetence at the time the statements 
were made). 
 149. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992). 
 150. Jones v. United States, 231 F.2d 244, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 151. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946-47 & n.9, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding child’s 
spontaneous declarations, her excited utterances, and statements made for purposes of medical 
treatment, were properly admitted, regardless of whether child was competent to testify at trial). 
 152. United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1442-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming the admission of 
child’s statement under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, even though child was ruled 
incompetent to testify at trial).  See also United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam) (affirming admission of three-year-old’s statement to mother; no discussion of competency of 
child). 
 153. State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1989) (admission under the residual exception to the hearsay 
rule, even though the defendant was not competent to testify at trial). 
 154. Johnson v. State, 492 A.2d 1343, 1345-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding admissible 
statement of 89-year-old victim); Jackson v. State, 356 A.2d 299, 300-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) 
(ruling excited utterance of four year old child was admissible); Moore v. State, 338 A.2d 344, 347 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (finding excited utterance of three-and-a-half-year-old child was properly 
admitted; child’s competence is “irrelevant since the testimonial qualifications do not apply to 
spontaneous declarations”); Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969). 
 155. State v. Rogers, 428 S.E.2d 220, 222, 226 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 156. State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 468-70, 473 (Ohio 1988). 
 157. State v. Ladner, 644 S.E.2d 684, 691-93 (S.C. 2007). 
 158. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). 
 159. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (affirming 
admission under Rule 803(4) of three-year-old’s out-of-court statements to doctors although the 
discussion of competence of child is not discussed).  See also Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 n.2 
(8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that although child interviewed on videotape by doctor was found not 
competent to testify, others could have testified to provide proper foundation, for admission under Fed. 
R. Evid. 803(4), that treating doctor’s role was explained to child and that she understood it). 
 160. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Neb. 2004) (admitting four-year-old’s statements to 
physician). 
 161. State v. Massengill, 62 P.3d 354, 361-62 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); State ex rel. Children, Youth & 
Families Dept. v. Frank G., 108 P.3d 543, 553-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d sub nom. In re Pamela 
A.G., 134 P.3d 746 (N.M. 2006). 
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to evidence qualifying under the hearsay exception for statements made when 
seeking medical diagnosis or treatment (Rule 803(4)).163  Appellate courts 
construing the state law of Arizona,164 Arkansas,165 Colorado,166 Florida,167 
Indiana,168 Kansas,169 Minnesota,170 Ohio,171 Oregon172 and Washington173 have 
                                                                                                                 
 162. State v. Waddell, 527 S.E.2d 644, 650-51 (N.C. 2000); State v. Rogers, 428 S.E.2d 220, 226-29 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 163. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
 164. State v. Superior Court, 719 P.2d 283, 289 (Ariz. 1986) (“[W]e reject the notion that the 
testimonial incapacity of a child renders the child’s out-of-court assertions inadmissible under § 13-
1416.”) 
 165. Cogburn v. State, 732 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Ark. 1987) (seven-year-old victim). 
 166. People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 745-51 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (three-year-old victim); 
People v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (four-year-old victim); People v. Hansen, 
920 P.2d 831, 838-39 (Colo. App. 1995) (no abuse of discretion in admitting child victim’s out-of-court 
statements).  See also e.g., People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 519-20 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (four-and-
one-half-year old victim’s testimony could have been admitted, ultimately affirming lower court’s non-
admission), aff’g 773 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Colo. App. 1988) (if four-and-one-half year-old’s incompetence 
at trial was caused only by her fear in courtroom setting, rather than an “inability, at the time of the 
alleged event, to receive just impressions of fact,” her out-of-court statements may have been inherently 
trustworthy, but in this particular instance were properly not admitted.). 
 167. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1989) (upholding, under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), the constitutionality, under the federal and Florida constitutions, of the Florida tender years 
statute and a conviction obtained with the admission under that statute of mother’s and police officer’s 
testimony to three-and-one-half-year-old’s statements—first made innocently and spontaneously to his 
baby sister in the bathtub, and repeated to his mother and the officer about an act that the child “didn’t 
think was wrong”—which trial court found to be reliable, as well as corroborated by other evidence, 
when the trial court found that the child was unavailable due to “a substantial likelihood of severe 
emotional or mental harm if required to participate in the trial or hearing”; appellate court “reject[ed] the 
argument that the child must be found to be competent to testify before the child’s out-of-court 
statements may be found to bear sufficient safeguards of reliability”).  See State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 
255, 263 (Fla. 2006) (upholding statute making admissible reliable, nontestimonial hearsay of a 
mentally disabled adult). 
 168. Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 470 (Ind. 2006). 
 169. Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (Kansas’s child hearsay statute did 
not violate confrontation clause, nor did admission of “unqualified” child’s reliable out-of-court 
statements to social worker and police officer; psychiatrist had testified that child knew difference 
between right and wrong and that his statements were reliable). 
 170. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 248, 256 (Minn. 2006) (child does not have to be 
competent to testify at trial in order for his statement to be admitted under the Minnesota “tender years” 
hearsay exception); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990) (three-year-old victim). 
 171. State v. Silverman, 906 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ohio 2009) (Ohio’s tender years exception does not 
require a finding of child declarant’s competency to testify). 
 172. State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 703-06 (Or. 1985) (if trial court holds competency hearings 
and finds alleged victim of child abuse incompetent to testify, child’s out-of-court statements may be 
admitted under hearsay exception for complaints of sexual misconduct). 
 173. Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993) (Washington state court committed no 
error in admitting out-of-court tender years statement of young child who was incompetent to testify at 
trial); State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 93 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (affirming conviction based on out-of-
court statements of three-year-old who parties stipulated was incompetent to testify); State v. C.J., 63 
P.3d 765, 767-73 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (affirming conviction of juvenile for child abuse of three-year-
old cousin, who at age four was found incompetent to testify at trial, where he was “very uncomfortable 
and frightened,” “unable to express a memory of the incident in words,” and “unable to characterize the 
difference between truthful and false statements”; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
tender years’ statutory requirement of reliability met, when statements were spontaneous and made the 
108 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
affirmed the admission of children’s out-of-court statements under “tender years” 
statutory exceptions applicable to victims of child abuse.  Several courts also have 
affirmed the admission of similar evidence under the “catch-all” or residual hearsay 
exception (Rule 807).174 
All of these courts properly look at the touchstone for admissibility as whether 
the declarant appears to have been capable of perceiving facts accurately and 
relating them rationally at the time of the making of the out-of-court statement.  
They recognize that the rationale for the applicable hearsay exception differs from 
the criteria for time-of-trial competency.  As Judge Madsen, writing for the 
Supreme Court of Washington in State v. C.J., explained: 
The different standards for determining testimonial competency and the reliability 
of an out of court statement are justifiably tailored to satisfy different purposes.  
The trial setting requires that a witness give reliable testimony and fully participate 
in cross examination, thus the witness’ ability to distinguish truthful statements 
from false statements, and knowledge of his sworn obligation to tell the truth, is 
paramount.  On the other hand, hearsay exceptions necessarily contemplate that 
the declarant’s perception, memory, and credibility will not be explored through 
the use of cross examination.  Instead, the trial court must find that the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement render the statement 
inherently trustworthy.175 
These cases implicitly recognize that young children can accurately report concrete 
facts close in time to a startling event, even if they are not competent to testify 
under oath at a trial. 
On the other hand, some lower courts have stated that a young child’s 
testimonial incompetence at trial necessarily means that the child’s earlier 
statements are unreliable.176 
4.  Authority Apparently in Conflict with Wright Ought Not Be Relied On 
For several reasons, the lower courts’ opinions which have stated that a child’s 
incompetence at trial necessarily requires the exclusion of her out-of-court 
                                                                                                                 
day after the incident “to adults he knew and trusted in informal, comfortable circumstances”); State v. 
Doe, 719 P.2d 554, 557-59 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (trial court erroneously “believed that if the child 
were incompetent at the time of trial, the statement the child made would not be reliable as a matter of 
law” and inadmissible under tender years statute); State v. Gribble, 804 P.2d 634, 640 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1991); State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566, 572 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Gitchel, 706 P.2d 1091, 1096 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
 174. United States v. Doe, 976 F.2d 1071, 1082 (7th Cir. 1992) (no abuse of discretion in admitting 
children’s hearsay statement under federal rules’ catch-all hearsay exception, even though district court 
conducted no inquiry to determine competency of three-year-old declarants); In re Pamela A.G., 134 
P.3d 746, 751-53 (N.M. 2006); State v. Massengill, 62 P.3d 354, 360 (N.M. 2003).  Cf. United States v. 
Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming admission of evidence under residual 
exception, when child’s trial testimony had been ineffective). 
 175. State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765, 771 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
 176. See infra Part III.C.4.  Cf. Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846, 850 (D. Kan. 1992) (state 
court violated defendant’s confrontation right [under then-applicable Ohio v. Roberts] by admitting out-
of-court statements of mentally retarded teenaged victim when court failed to make finding of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness of the statements and, inter alia, preliminary hearing judge 
found declarant unavailable to testify on ground that she could not discern truth from falsehood). 
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statements ought not be followed.  First, they are at odds with, and thus trumped 
by, the Wright Court’s reasoning.177 
Second, they often rely on Wigmore as support for their equation of 
incompetence at trial with inadmissibility of pretrial statements.178  Yet Wigmore 
himself not only reported that the existing law permitted the admission of excited 
utterances regardless of the declarant’s testimonial competency, he advocated that 
courts  “let the child testify” without delving into the child’s competency.179 
Third, a lawyer researching the question might find an A.L.R. annotation 
which cites several cases for the proposition that a child must be competent to 
testify in order for his hearsay statement to come in.180  This annotation should be 
discredited as, upon close analysis, the holding in several of these cases was that 
the statements did not fall within a hearsay exception.181  Thus the statements were 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence, regardless of whether the declarant was 
competent to testify, and the courts did not have to reach the issue of whether such 
competency was required.  Other cases cited in the annotation have been limited or 
overruled.182 
Both the Supreme Court in Wright and the vast majority of lower court cases 
directly addressing the issue opine that time-of-trial incompetence does not ipso 
facto preclude the admission of a declarant’s out-of-court statement.  As applied to 
child declarants, this approach is consonant with research in the field of 
developmental psychology, which this author argues ought be more consciously 
folded into the courts’ analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See supra Part III.C.1.  
 178. E.g., State v. Said, 644 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio 1994). 
 179. See supra notes 50-51. 
 180. Uehlein, supra note 89, § 28.  See also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Admissibility of Testimony 
Regarding Spontaneous Declarations Made by One Incompetent to Testify at Trial, 15 A.L.R. 4th 1043 
(1982 & Supp. 2010); E. J. Spires, Annotation, Declarant’s Age as Affecting Admissibility of Res 
Gestae, 83 A.L.R. 2d 1368 (1962 & Supp. 2001). 
 181. State v. Campbell, 579 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (Mont. 1978) (evidence did not qualify under any 
exception to hearsay rule, and could not be offered as to credibility of a declarant who did not testify; 
evidence also violated the propensity rule); Martin v. State, 393 P.2d 141, 143 (Nev. 1964); Mitchell v. 
State, 279 S.W. 1112, 1113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (statement by child that hat shown to child was 
“Uncle Adolph’s,” was offered as a tacit admission of the uncle, for which it did not qualify). 
 182. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984) (en banc), was later rejected by the same court, 
which stated in State v. Doe, 719 P.2d 554, 557 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), that Ryan did not really hold 
that competency at trial was required for the “tender years” exception’s use; rather, the hearsay should 
not have been admitted because it did not meet the statutory requirement that the children be shown to 
be unavailable before their statements could be admitted without their testimony.  The underlying 
passage in Ryan is “admittedly confusing.”  State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Wash. Ct App. 1987).  
Doe’s reading was adhered to in State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765, 770-71 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). 
State v. Silverman, 906 N.E. 2d 427, (Ohio 2009) characterized the court’s earlier position in 
State v. Said, 644 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1994) as dicta and disavowed it: “The plain text of Evid. R. 807, the 
cogent dissent in Said, and the reasoning of C.J. and El Paso provide compelling reasons to find that the 
dicta in Said that judicially grafted the competence requirement onto Evid. R. 807 is improper and does 
not effectuate the rule.” Silverman, 906 N.E.2d at 433. 
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IV.  COURTS SHOULD BE INFORMED BY RESEARCH PERFORMED BY 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGISTS 
The judicial system’s treatment of child victims and child declarants may be 
legitimately criticized as having underutilized knowledge that can be gained from 
research in the social sciences field of developmental psychology.183  Recent 
research in that field continues to shed new light on the abilities of children to 
perceive, relate, and remember events.184  Piaget was the ground-breaker in this 
field, but post-Piaget research shows that younger children have more 
competencies than he had concluded.  As Professor Lyon has pointed out, 
“competencies first believed to emerge later in childhood have been exhibited by 
very young children if the verbal demands of the tasks are minimized and if the 
tasks are stripped of extraneous complications.”185  Yet the courts lag behind, and 
tend to hold children at an unjustified disadvantage. 
First, our judicial system often mistreats and misunderstands children by 
treating them as “little adults,” as when it requires them to demonstrate an 
understanding of abstract concepts or to answer complex or hypothetical questions.  
Secondly (and without noticing the logical inconsistencies), our system views 
children’s recollection or testimony with greater suspicion than it does adults.186  In 
so doing, it overlooks the fact that adult witnesses’ memories and testimony are 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Cf. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent 
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL’Y 275, 365 (2006) 
(urging, in the context of children’s capacity to act so as to be legally bound, that the law be greater 
informed by the psychological literature as to how children think and behave); Raeder, supra note 3, at 
256 (proposing that children’s testimonial competency be evaluated by a court-appointed psychologist 
who is “knowledgeable about child development,” who then would make a recommendation to the 
judge). 
 184. See generally PATRICIA J. BAUER, Early Memory Development, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF 
CHILDHOOD COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 127 (Usha Goswami ed., 2002) [hereinafter BAUER, Early 
Memory]; PATRICIA J. BAUER, REMEMBERING THE TIMES OF OUR LIVES: MEMORY IN INFANCY AND 
BEYOND 3 (2006) [hereinafter BAUER, REMEMBERING]. 
 185. Lyon, supra note 15, at 1035 & n.67.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 31.03; Gilstrap et al., supra 
note 13, at 61 & n.4, 65-67, 79 (discussing memory capabilities from ages two to five, “on average”); 
Andrea Follmer Greenhoot & Sarah L. Brunnell, Trauma and Memory, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 37-
38 (research shows that “the ability to provide coherent verbal recollections seems to emerge between 2 
and 3 years of age . . . [but] evidence for the translation of preverbal memories into verbal form is slim. . 
. .”; “the core of [one-time traumatic] events tends to be remembered quite well; and research regarding 
children’s memory of repeated maltreatment supports the conclusion that memory for abuse is related to 
a number of well-established predictions of memory from the basic memory literature, such as child age, 
reexposure, and generic autobiographical memory skills”). 
 186. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 443-44 (2009) (holding that Eighth Amendment 
precluded capital punishment for rape of a child not resulting in, nor intended to result in, child’s death; 
Court stated: “There are . . . serious systemic concerns in prosecuting the crime of child rape that are 
relevant to the constitutionality of making it a capital offense. The problem of unreliable, induced, and 
even imagined child testimony means there is a special risk of wrongful execution in some child rape 
cases. . . .  Similar circumstances pertain to other cases involving child witnesses; but child rape cases 
present heightened concerns because the central narrative and account of the crime often comes from the 
child herself.”)  Fiona E. Raitt, Judging Children’s Credibility—Cracks in the Culture of Disbelief, or 
Business as Usual, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 735 (2010) (discussing Scottish trial system); Sugarman, 
supra note 15. See also, e.g., Shanks, supra note 85, at 575-76 (arguing that “[c]riminal trials involving 
allegations of the sexual abuse of a young child are particularly susceptible to wrongful convictions” 
and proposing that child competency determinations be greatly strengthened). 
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subject to many of the same weaknesses as children’s. 
Fairness dictates that the reliability of both children’s and adult’s out-of-court 
statements be evaluated in light of their ability at the time of the statements to have 
“received just impressions of the facts and [to have] relat[ed] them truly.”187  If the 
record shows that they could not have had this ability, so that the statements are 
necessarily unreliable, the statements ought be excluded under Rule 403 or by the 
due process clause.188 
But the evaluation of children’s competency to testify at trial should be made 
by using age-appropriate language; words that they are familiar with; and concrete, 
simple sentence structure.  For example, rather than asking them, “If I told you I 
was wearing a red dress, would that be a lie?” one might ask, one at a time, “Tell 
me about my dress.” “What color is it?” “Is that the real color?” “Is it ‘make 
believe’?” “Is it ‘pretend’?” 
A.  In Some Ways, Children Are Different from Adults, and Courts Must Treat 
Them Differently 
The Supreme Court has properly recognized, in some contexts, that children 
are different from adults and that society owes children special protection.189  It has 
noted, with regard to punishment of juveniles, that young persons’ brains function 
differently than do those of mature adults.190  Numerous states’ adoption of “tender 
years” hearsay exceptions,191 too, is a manifestation that the courts and legislatures 
sometimes recognize that children are different from adults.192 
Yet we continue—despite commentators’ valid criticisms—to examine, and to 
permit the examination of, child witnesses with questions that are developmentally 
inappropriate.193  Although testimony by child victims may impede their 
recovery,194 the rights of others sometimes requires it; in that event, the 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 188. See supra notes 125, 143-44. 
 189. See Graham v. Florida, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile offender who did not commit homicide); 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s 
interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”) 
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) (citations omitted)); Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (“[A] State’s interest in ‘the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further 
trauma and embarrassment’ is a ‘compelling’ one”) (citation omitted). 
 190. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (striking down the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders). 
 191. See Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland’s “Tender Years” War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 
21, 22 n.3 (1997) (collecting statutes). 
 192. See, e.g., Kritsings v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 984 A.2d 395, 404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2009) (“[W]ith respect to contributory negligence, children under the age of 10 are evaluated according 
to their ‘age, experience, and training.’”) (citation omitted).  As to the need for “tender years” 
exceptions, see Clark, supra note 15, at 262; McLain, supra note 191, at 25. 
 193. See Lyon, supra note 15, at 1027 n.42 (describing “convoluted and developmentally 
inappropriate” questioning of children).  
 194. Some child advocates have argued that public testimony by abused children is harmful to them.  
Patton, supra note 22, at 375-77.  See also State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Frank G., 
108 P.3d 543, 549 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that courtroom testimony by young, sexually 
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examination should be appropriately aimed at discovering the truth.  This author 
urges trial courts to exercise their authority under Rule 611(a)195 to preclude 
confusing, developmentally inappropriate questioning, as it does not further the 
pursuit of a trial’s overarching goals of the ascertainment of the truth and the 
furtherance of justice.196  Counsel should be informed of this policy before trial, so 
as to have time to prepare proper questions. 
Secondly, in evaluating the reliability of young children’s hearsay statements, 
the courts should take into account developmental psychology research that shows 
that children’s abilities of perception, recall, and linguistic abilities may make them 
capable of having made accurate statements under different circumstances than 
those they would be required to satisfy if called to testify under oath at trial.197  
Each situation must be evaluated under the criteria pertinent to it.  One would not 
measure distance with a thermometer, or temperature with a yardstick.  When 
performing surgery, a competent physician would not accept a year-old blood 
pressure reading instead of one taken just before the operation. 
Similarly, one ought not equate the admissibility or inadmissibility of an 
earlier out-of-court statement to the admissibility or inadmissibility of the 
                                                                                                                 
abused child would be harmful to her recovery through therapy), aff’d sub nom. In re Pamela A.G., 134 
P.3d 746 (N.M. 2006). 
 Indeed, biological research is being conducted that is related to, or premised upon, the 
therapeutic value of repressing memories of abuse.  See Meredith Cohn, Method to Erase Traumatic 
Memories May be on the Horizon, BALT. SUN (Nov. 2, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-
22/health/bs-hs-erasing-memories-20101122_1_fearful-memory-proteins-researchers (noting that 
developing research demonstrates that removing certain proteins from the brain and behavioral therapy 
may soon allow for the erasing of traumatic memories). 
 195. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) provides: 
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and 
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
FED. R. EVID. 611. As restyled effective December 1, 2011, Rule 611 reads: 
The Court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for 
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment 
or undue embarrassment. 
FED. R. EVID. 611 (Proposed Official Draft 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed0809/EV_Rules.pdf. 
 196. See Bussey, supra note 84, at 225-26 (Research shows that cross-examination by “confusing and 
leading questions,” “complex language,” and “credibility-challenging comments” does “not serve the 
truth-seeking function of the court,” but “only serves to increase the unreliability of children’s 
testimony.”). 
The current Federal Rule of Evidence 102 (captioned “Purpose and Construction”) provides: 
“These rules [of evidence] shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the 
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”  FED. R. EVID. 102.  As 
restyled effective December 1, 2011, Rule 102 reads: “These rules should be construed so as to 
administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”  
FED. R. EVID. 102 (Proposed Official Draft 2011). 
 197. Cf. Lyon, supra note 15, at 1027 (discussing application of developmental psychology research 
in the context of qualifying children to be competent witnesses at trial). 
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declarant’s in-court testimony at the time of trial.  Those courts that have 
recognized that the two inquiries are distinct from each other find strong support in 
recent research in the field of developmental psychology. 
1.  Perception 
Both adults and children can accurately perceive a concrete event such as 
being touched by another person.  Many parents and teachers of young children no 
doubt can remember their reporting that “Johnny hit me!” or “He touched me 
first!”  Adult and children’s perceptions of an event may differ in one sense, 
because of their different understandings of the context of the event.  Our 
perception of an event as ordinary or extraordinary—“worth remembering” or 
not—can affect whether our brains’ chemical processes sear it into our long-term 
memory.  Young children’s understanding of certain events—such as sexual 
fondling—as wrong and therefore noteworthy, may well be lacking.198  This can 
contribute to failure to report the event, delayed reporting, or “offhand,” “matter of 
fact” reporting, as well as to lack of long-term memory of the event.  But it has not 
been shown to mean that a child does not perceive the fondling in the first place. 
2.  Memory 
Memory capabilities may vary with age.  Anyone who has spent time with 
elderly people—or who has grown older oneself—has seen firsthand that “short-
term memory” seems to fade with advancing age.  Hence such questions are voiced 
as, “Where did I put my keys?” “Where did I put my glasses?” “Why did I go 
upstairs?” “Was I looking for something?”  An older person may well remember 
the name of his fifth grade teacher but not the name of his current cardiologist.  The 
“long-term memory” is strong, but the short-term memory capacity is fading. 
Anecdotal observations of young children lead to the opposite conclusions as 
to their capacities.  When asked, they often recount many details about their 
activities of that day, including details which an adult listener would have found 
insignificant and promptly forgotten.  This may be because “everything is new” to 
a young child, so that the short-term memory is strong, or it may be that adults have 
learned to cull the “important” or “interesting” events from the insignificant ones, 
so as not to attempt to remember the unimportant ones. 
Most adults can remember very little, if anything, before they turned three or 
four,199 leading us to conclude that children have little long-term memory.  Recent 
psychological research suggests, however, that young children have the capacity 
for greater long-term memory,200 and that the reason that we recall so little from 
our early years is that those memories were not reinforced.201  Repeating a story or 
relating an event at dinner with family can help to single out that memory for more 
permanent storage.  The longer memory an adult may have for an event may be a 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See supra notes 105, 167. 
 199. BAUER, REMEMBERING, supra note 184, at 17. 
 200. Id. at 229, 232, 236, 252; BAUER, Early Memory, supra note 184; USHA GOSWAMI, COGNITION 
IN CHILDREN 177, 180 (1998). 
 201. BAUER, REMEMBERING, supra note 184, at 249-52. 
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function not of inherent ability, but of the importance attributed to the event.202  If 
perceived to be important, it will be reiterated and reinforced.  If not, it may slide 
away into the subconscious.   
A child’s not remembering an event by the time of trial does not necessarily 
invalidate a child’s report at a time much closer to the event.  This remains true 
even if an adult would have perceived the event as traumatic.  A judge’s looking at 
the issue through his or her adult eyes could cause the judge to misassess the 
situation, absent being informed about the pertinent research.  
One must also be careful to look at the research regarding children in light of 
corollary research regarding adults. 
B.  All Witnesses’ Memories are Fallible 
Much of the psychological research on children focuses on whether they are 
suggestible, and what kinds of interviews may implant false memories.203  The use 
of improper interviewing techniques adversely impacts the reliability of the 
interviewee’s responses.  But the broader psychological research shows that this is 
a phenomenon that is not restricted to child interviewees.  False memories in 
adults, due to suggestion, have been well documented in decades of research by 
Elizabeth Loftus and others.204  In fact, the results of some experiments show that 
kindergarteners were no more influenced by leading questions than were young 
adults, and that the younger children’s reports were more often accurate than were 
the adults’.205 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. at 34-39. 
 203. E.g., Iris Blandón-Gitin & Kathy Pezdek, Children’s Memory in Forensic Contexts: 
Suggestibility, False Memory, and Individual Differences, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 57-59 
(discussing “factors associated with children’s . . . increased accuracy: prior event knowledge [of type of 
event recalled, such as a doctor’s examination], repeated experience, multiple nonsuggestive interviews, 
and source monitoring [i.e., real experience, imagination, or suggestion] and training [of children 
regarding sources]” and citing “five factors found to have a strong association with children’s 
suggestibility and relevant to forensic contexts: age, language ability, inhibitory control, working 
memory capacity, and attachment styles [of their mothers]”); STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, 
JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (Am. Psychol. 
Ass’n., Wash., D.C. 1995); EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 31.04; GABRIELLE F. PRINCIPE, STEPHEN J. CECI & 
MAGGIE BRUCK, CHILDREN’S MEMORY: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN’S 
WORLDS) (2011).  See also State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379-80 (N.J. 1994) (reversing conviction 
due to jury’s necessarily having relied on fantastic statements elicited from children during improperly 
suggestive and coercive interrogations, and remanding for pretrial hearing at which state would be 
required to prove reliability of statements and resultant testimony by clear and convincing evidence 
before it could be admitted at retrial).  But see Gilstrap, supra note 13, at 68-77 (stressing suggestibility 
of children; noting, however, that some children are quite resistant to suggestion). 
 204. E.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, David G. Miller & Helen J. Burns, Semantic Integration of Verbal 
Information into a Visual Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 19 
(1978). 
 205. See Dominic J. Foté, Comment, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their 
Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (1985).  
Several experiments proceeded as follows: 
[C]hildren and adults ranging in age from 5 to 22 watched the experimenter and a 
confederate engage in a heated conversation.  At varying intervals, those viewing the 
argument were asked to narrate exactly what they had seen, to answer objective questions 
about the incident, including a leading question, and to identify the confederate from a 
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Dr. Loftus and others have also documented how one memory can supplant 
another in an adult.206  For example, after one makes an identification of a 
particular suspect as an assailant, as in a line-up, the memory will harden, and each 
time one sees that person one’s certainty that this was the assailant will increase,207 
though there is no increase in the underlying accuracy.  (This should ring true to 
anyone who has lost a bet on something one was “sure” of.) 
The pertinent research on this topic is of adult victims.  This kind of 
information is used in court to attack the weight to be given the identification, not 
to exclude it altogether from evidence.  The same approach is properly used with 
regard to adult witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements or inconsistencies during 
their testimony.  They may be used to impeach the witness.208 
The scientific literature demonstrates that some inconsistencies in recollection 
over time are normal for both adults and children.209  Fallibility of children’s 
memory ought not preclude probative evidence of their testimony or out-of-court 
statements any more than it ought preclude evidence provided by adults; rather, it is 
                                                                                                                 
photo array. . . . .  The duration of a subject’s exposure to the confederate was fifteen 
seconds, from a distance of approximately seven feet.  At intervals of ten or thirty 
minutes, the subjects were evaluated on free recall, direct questions including one leading 
question, and photo identification.  Two weeks later, the subjects returned and were 
reassessed, this time using a non-leading question. 
Id. at 158-59 & n.8 (citing Marin et al., supra note 122, at 297-98)  This “Marin” study: 
[I]ndicated that very young children were as capable as adults in answering direct 
questions about the incident.  Also, young children scored as well as adults in identifying 
from a photo array.  Perhaps most surprising was the data indicating that children were 
no more easily swayed to answer incorrectly by the use of leading questions than were 
adults.  One finding did indicate that children were not as capable as adults to freely 
articulate their version of what occurred.  Nonetheless, while the youngest children 
tended to say little, what they did say was three times more likely to be accurate than 
what the adults said. 
The Marin study concluded that the main problem with young witnesses is not 
their ability to accurately perceive events, but their ability to accurately and meaningfully 
report their perceptions.  Given certain external prompts and cues, however, “the young 
witness would be expected to perform quite adequately.”  In the final analysis, “it would 
seem, then, that children as young as five years of age are no less competent or credible 
as eyewitnesses than are adults when responding to direct objective questions.” 
Id. at 159 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 206. Loftus, et al., supra note 204, at 30.  See also Lyon, supra note 15, at 1030 n.50 (reporting a 
study noting “some evidence of a recency effect” in adults). 
 207. Loftus, et al., supra note 204, at 30. 
 208. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613 (permitting impeachment of witnesses by their prior inconsistent 
statements); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 1990) (“Whether a child is easily led goes 
more to credibility than to competency.  Even adults at trial become inconsistent upon cross-
examination.  It is the jury’s province to sort out the inconsistencies and determine credibility . . . .”). 
 209. See Tate ex rel Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding child 
competent despite his having made some inconsistent statements); Gilstrap, supra note 13, at 76-77; 
Bradley D. McAuliff, Child Victim and Witness Research Comes of Age: Implications for Social 
Scientists, Practitioners, and the Law, in Bottoms, supra note 6, at 104-05 (“Children, like adults, 
usually are able to remember details of single and ongoing traumatic events quite well, but at the same 
time these memories are vulnerable to distortion and forgetting . . . .” “Realistically we can expect 
victims to forget the details of events over time, especially in cases of chronic maltreatment . . . .”).  Cf. 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 414, 417 (2008) (where child victim’s prior inconsistencies 
apparently arose from defendant’s instructions to her to inculpate individuals other than him). 
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a proper subject of impeachment.  Moreover, there is some evidence that adults are 
more likely than young children to “lie” intentionally.210 
C.  The Better Reasoned Cases Regarding Children’s Statements Are Consonant 
with the Scientific Research in Developmental Psychology 
Those cases, like Idaho v. Wright,211 which clearly distinguish between a 
child’s ability to testify at trial and the child’s ability to have made an accurate 
statement at the time of an out-of-court statement (that falls within a hearsay 
exception), have acted in accord with developmental psychology research.  A child 
may have had the ability to make a concrete, accurate report well before trial, yet 
may have no memory of the underlying facts at trial. 
Similarly, a young child’s inability to explicate, or demonstrate in an adult-like 
way an understanding of abstract concepts of “truth” and “lies” at the time of trial 
is developmentally appropriate.212  Courts should use and permit only 
developmentally appropriate language and sentence structure when evaluating the 
child’s competency to testify.  But even if the child is properly found incompetent, 
those cases that automatically equate testimonial incompetence at time of trial to 
unreliability of the child’s out-of-court statement have failed to perform adequate 
analysis. 
The proper approach, instead, is to look at the child’s ability to have made a 
reliable statement of the type made, at the time made.  If the child had that 
capacity, her out-of-court statement should not be rejected out of hand.  Rather, the 
courts must evaluate the statement’s reliability under all the pertinent 
circumstances and exclude it under Rule 403 or the due process clause only if no 
reasonable fact-finder could find it to be reliable.  This is the same approach that is 
universally followed with regard to adult declarants.  Children, who are in greater 
need of protection, ought not be treated less respectfully than adults. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Cases where children are the key witnesses—especially child abuse cases—are 
the most challenging cases facing our justice system.  We have special duties both 
to protect children and to prevent the wrongful conviction, or the wrongful 
termination of parental rights, of an alleged abuser.  We must work to keep refining 
our approaches in light of advancing knowledge about children—their thought 
processes, how they perceive and remember, and their linguistic abilities—to make 
the system as fair as possible to all parties, so that “the truth may be ascertained 
and proceedings justly determined.”213  The questioning of children as to their 
competency to testify and, if permitted to testify, on direct and cross examination, 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Lyon, supra note 15, at 1036 n.71. 
 211. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 212. See generally Lyon, supra note 15.  Professor Lyon has argued that the oath-taking requirement 
for children, as presently enforced, does little to advance its intended objective: that only testimony of 
those who are sincere witnesses will be received.  Id. at 1027-28 & nn.42-43, 1047-48 & nn.98 & 103.  
He has proposed an alternative form of the oath which is “developmentally sensitive,” and which his 
empirical research has shown can enhance accuracy.  Id. at 1021. 
 213. FED. R. EVID. 102.  See also supra note 196. 
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should be developmentally appropriate in content and structure. 
If a child is found incompetent to testify at trial, her out-of-court statements 
should not be automatically excluded.  Instead, their reliability should be evaluated 
in light of developmental psychology research as to whether the child was capable, 
at the time of making the statement, of having accurately perceived and reported 
the underlying facts.  If the child had that capability (and there is no confrontation 
clause barrier), the evidence generally should be admitted, and the fact-finder 
tasked with determining what weight to give it.  Evidence Rule 403 and the due 
process clause provide the two final safeguards against a verdict being based on 
clearly unreliable hearsay.  Applying these parameters will enable us to best fulfill 
our duties to all affected by the trial system, whether children or adults. 
 
       
